Reinsurance Focus

The English Commercial Court has ruled that Standard Life Assurance Ltd can not recover damages from its underwriters arising out of the improper sales of mortgage endowment policies, but could claim against its insurance broker, Aon. Standard Life subscribed to a policy with a liability cover of £75 million in excess of £25 million. The policy contained a provision permitting the aggregation of claims arising from an originating cause or source. The insured aggregated 97,000 small claims and sought to recover the full £75 million excess of £25 million. The underwriters claimed that even if the claims did arise from a single originating cause, the claims could not be aggregated because the policy schedule and slip contained the wording “excess: £25million each and every claim and/or claimant.”

The court agreed with the underwriters, finding that the policy did not allow for the claims to be aggregated together, meaning the excess limit could not be reached. Specifically, the court found no “plausible purpose for the inclusion of the words ‘and/or claimant’ in the excess provision in the slip other than the attempted achievement of a per claimant excess.”

Prior to the court’s ruling, Aon brought its own negligence claim against Reynolds Porter Chamberlain (“RPC”) as a third party to the proceedings. Aon’s claim against RPC argues that the firm did not recognize that the wording of the policy meant the claims could not be grouped together. Standard Life Assurance Ltd. – and – Oak Dedicated Ltd. – and – Aon Ltd., Reynolds Porter Chamberlain, [2008] EWHC 222 (Comm. Feb. 13, 2008).

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.

In a May 23, 2007 post, we reported on a UK decision denying reinsurance coverage despite a follow the fortunes provision based on a finding that the damages occurred outside the coverage period of the reinsurance, despite the conclusion of a US court on the underlying claim finding liability for damage occurring outside the coverage period of the underlying policy. The UK Court of Appeals has allowed an appeal, finding that the coverage provision of the reinsurance should be interpreted in the same manner as the coverage provision in the underlying insurance.

The English appellate court agreed that the insurance and reinsurance contracts were not entirely “back to back” in terms of the coverage periods, but concluded that although there were some differences in the contracts, the parties intended that they should have the same effect and therefore, the reinsured’s settlement of the insurance claim did fall within the terms of the reinsurance contract. Despite the fact that the reinsurance appeared only to cover damage that occurred during the period of the reinsurance, and the trigger of coverage used by the US court permitted a broader recovery from the insurer, the Court of Appeals accepted the proposition that “the same or equivalent [coverage] wordings should be given the same meaning in the reinsurance contract as in the insurance contract.”

Explaining that the UK reinsurer had taken certain known risks in reinsuring a US insurer, the Court concluded that although the judgment against the insured was not one which the reinsurers expected, nevertheless it was one which was a possibility that they agreed to cover. This decision marks a departure from previous ‘follow the settlement’ cases involving differences in the insurance and reinsurance contracts, which have typically been resolved in favor of the reinsurers. Wasa International Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., [2008] EWCA Civ 150 (Feb. 29, 2008).

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.

On June 14, 2007 and November 27, 2007, we reported on a $88 million arbitration award rendered in Russia involving energy giant Gazprom, and efforts to enforce the award in the United States and the United Kingdon pursuant to the New York Convention, the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the UK’s Arbitration Act of 1996. In a last attempt to avoid the arbitration award, it was contended to the UK Commercial Court that the award should not be enforced because it was contrary to public policy due to fraud in the underlying arbitration proceeding and the underlying reinsurance transactions, which appeared not to transfer any risk. The Commercial Court has rejected the presentation, concluding that the award had been confirmed through the Russian courts and that the alleged irregularities were insufficient to warrant a refusal to enforce the award. Gater Assets Limited v. Nak Naftogaz Ukrainiy [2008] EWHC 237 (Comm. Feb. 15, 2008).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

In 2004, Aon (a London broker) placed reinsurance for risks that United Insurance Company (a Libyan insurance company) assumed in insuring assets of a Libyan state-owned oil company. Aon also obtained reinsurance for United in relation to a Libyan company in the chemicals industry. Aon placed the business in the London market. After renewing the business in 2005, United brought three claims against Aon. United sought to recover brokerage fees paid to Aon on the basis that Aon misrepresented the nature of cover, commissions, and fees. United was unsuccessful on all of its claims. The Commercial Court found that United’s evidence did not match the relevant contemporary documents and was contradicted by Aon’s evidence. United Insurance Co of Libya v. Aon Ltd., [2007] EWHC 1583 (Comm. July 5, 2007). This opinion is not on the UK Court site, but is available on WESTLAW at 2007 WL 1942745.

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.

A subscription-only reporting service on the London reinsurance market cases is available at Lloyd’s Law Reports: insurance and reinsurance, with commentaries on cases by Ian Hunter (QC) and Professor Robert Merkin.  This company also sells a reinsurance treatise titled Reinsurance Practice and the Law.

This post written by Rollie Goss.

According to a recent decision from the UK Commercial Court, a reinsurer’s obligation to “follow the settlements” of its cedent does not apply when the reinsurance contract contains terms making its scope narrower than the original policy. In this case, the cedent, Aegis, sought to recover from its reinsurer, Continental Casualty Company (“CCC”), for claims arising from incidents at an oil refinery. Aegis had settled the claims made by the refinery owner. CCC denied the claim relying on the fact that additional conditions and definitions relating to boiler and machinery cover were attached to the slip which, if found to apply to the entire contract, would exclude recovery. The same definitions did not appear in the underlying policy. The Court found against Aegis on the issue of contract interpretation, and held that since the original policy and the reinsurance policy were not entirely “back to back,” Aegis could not rely on the follow the settlements provision. Aegis Electrical and Gas International Services Co. Ltd. v. Continental Casualty Company, [2007] EWHC 1762 (Comm. July 25, 2007). This opinion is not available on the UK Court site, but is available on WESTLAW at 2007 WL 2041964.

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.

In a July 12, 2007 post, we reported on issues relating to HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited (“HIH”). The question before the court was whether it had jurisdiction to entertain a request under the Insolvency Act for directions to the liquidators in England to transfer assets collected by them to the liquidators in an Australian liquidation. The Court of Appeal held that it would not direct a transfer of the English assets by the English provisional liquidators to the Australian liquidators because to do so would prejudice the interests of many of the creditors. The House of Lords disagreed, allowing an appeal and ruling that the English assets of the insolvent insurer should be remitted to the Australian liquidator. There were sharp differences of opinion as to why exactly that should be the case.

The HIH group presented winding up petitions to the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 2001. Some of the assets, which consisted mostly of reinsurance claims on London policies, were situated in England, so English provisional liquidators were appointed. The Australian judge subsequently issued winding up orders and sent a letter to the High Court in London asking that the provisional liquidators remit the assets to the Australian liquidators for distribution in accordance with Australian law. The question on appeal was whether the English court could and should accede to the request. The alternative was a separate liquidation and distribution of the English assets under the English Insolvency Act of 1986. The manner of distribution mattered because Australian law generally gave priority to insurance creditors at the expense of other creditors, while the same result would not obtain under English law.

The decision was resolved primarily by analyzing the tension between section 426(4) of the Insolvency Act, which allows an English court with insolvency jurisdiction to assist designated foreign courts (including Australian courts), and section 426(5) of the same Act, which allows a court discretion to provide assistance in accordance with the rules of private international law, including the common law principle of “modified universalism.” That principle requires United Kingdom courts to cooperate with Australian courts to ensure that all the assets are distributed under a single system of distribution. While the court stated that a refusal to remit the assets might be appropriate if it causes a manifest injustice to a creditor, it ultimately found that the Australian distribution was not unacceptably discriminatory or contrary to public policy.

The dispute was focused on whether the basis of jurisdiction ought to be grounded in the common law considerations allowed by section 426(5) or the discrete statutory authority of section 426(4). Lord Hoffmann would have allowed the remission solely through the exercise of common law principles. He argued that under the common law doctrine of ancillary winding up, English courts may “disapply” parts of the statutory scheme by authorizing the English liquidator to allow actions he is obliged by statute to perform in accordance with English law to be performed by the foreign liquidator in accordance with foreign law. Others, including Lord Phillips, rejected this view: “I do not propose to stray from the firm area of common ground [of allowing the appeal under section 426] onto the controversial area of whether, in the absence of statutory jurisdiction, the same result could have been reached under a discretion available under the common law.” Lord Neuberger, too, opposed Lord Hoffman’s view, stating that he took “the view that it would not have been open to an English court to make the order sought by the Australian liquidators in the absence of section 426(4) and (5) of the 1986 Act.” McGrath v. Riddell [2008] UKHL 21 (Apr. 9, 2008).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

Coromin, a Bermuda based captive insurer, sought indemnification from its reinsurers for physical damage and business interruption losses suffered by its insured as a result of a defective mill motor at a copper mining and processing facility in Chile. The reinsurance policy was an ‘all risks’ property cover with an exclusion for damage or business interruption caused by a defective condition due to design defect, but with an additional extension which reintroduced that element of cover with a form of wording on which the dispute centered. The reinsurers argued that the extension did not apply because Coromon failed to comply with one of four conditions of the extension clause.

The Court, relying on principles of policy construction set out in Absalom v TCRU [2006] 2LLR 129, found that each of the four requirements of the extension were met in respect of the defective mill motor. The English Court applied the following principles of construction: (1) examine and interpret terms in their contractual context; (2) take into account surrounding background matters, but exclude evidence of negotiations and subjective intent; and (3) reject a conclusion that “flouts business common sense.” These principles are generally consistent with contract construction in the United States. Coromin Ltd v AXA Re & Ors [2007] EWHC 2818 (Comm).

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.

On November 28, 2006, we reported on a ruling by the UK Commercial Court that Lloyd’s Names did not have a cause of action against the government for alleged damages due to the improper implementation of an EEC Insurance Directive. The UK Court of Appeals has affirmed that decision, holding that the assumed failure to transpose the requirements of the Insurance Directive into national law can not be the basis for claims against the national government by the Names. Having disposed of the appeal on this issue, the Court of Appeals did not reach the alternative holding that the claims of the Names were barred by the statute of limitation. Poole v. Her Majesty’s Treasury [2007] EWCA Civ 1021 (Oct. 24, 2007).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

On December 6, 2006, we reported on the decision of a UK court, which interpreted a provision requiring notice to a reinsurer of a claim. The issue was whether the reinsured had knowledge of a loss when its stock price fell due to accounting restatements. While the Commercial Court decided that such activity did not amount to knowledge of a loss, the Court of Appeals disagreed. The UK Court of Appeal therefore reversed, finding that the notification of loss was late under the requirements of the reinsurance agreement. AIG Europe v. Faraday Capital Limited [2007] EWCA Civ 1208 (Nov. 22, 2007).

This post written by Rollie Goss.