Reinsurance Focus

In this English case, the claimant reinsurer, Markel, applied for the UK equivalent of summary judgment against two defendant German reinsureds, seeking a declaration that it was not liable under a contract of reinsurance. The primary issue was whether the contract provided in a claims cooperation clause that it was a condition precedent to any liability under it that if the reinsureds knew of any circumstances which may give rise to a claim against them, they should advise Markel within thirty days. Conflicting evidence was submitted as to whether the parties had agreed to the clause as suggested by Markel. Consequently, the court stated it was unable to accept Markel’s submission that there should be summary judgment since the issue involved questions of fact to be determined at trial. The court further addressed the separate issue of whether knowledge of the manager of the reinsurance pool (VOV) amounted to knowledge of the reinsureds for purposes of the claims cooperation clause. The court rejected Markel’s construction of the clause, holding that under the terms expressed, knowledge of VOV would not be imputed. Summary judgment was denied on all issues. Markel Capital Ltd. v. Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG [2008] EWHC 2517 (Comm. Oct. 24, 2008).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

In Mopani Copper Mines PLC v. Millenium Underwriting Limited [2008] EWHC 1331 (Comm. June 16, 2008), the UK Commercial Court determined that under appropriate circumstances it could consider words deleted from a reinsurance slip during the negotiation of its terms in interpreting the scope of coverage ultimately agreed to. The court held that it also could consider the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, the intention of the parties to the contract, and the terms of a prior agreement, but that it would not consider the content of prior negotiations, communications between the insured and its broker which were not communicated to the reinsurers, and the subjective views of the parties as to what they thought they had achieved. This opinion contains an interesting discussion of the factors considered by English courts in the interpretation of reinsurance slips, and should be read by any of our readers who face such issues, or who enter into slips which may be subject to interpretation under English legal principles.

This post written by Rollie Goss.

Reinsurance treaties often contain so-called “service of suit” clauses. The clause typically states something to the effect that “in the event of the failure of Reinsurer hereon to pay any amount claimed to be due, Reinsurer hereon, at the request of the Reinsured, will submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent jurisdiction within the United States and will comply with all requirements necessary to give such Court jurisdiction and all matters arising hereunder shall be determined in accordance with the law and practice of such Court.” Practitioners may wish to consider the interaction of this clause with an arbitration clause co-existing in the same treaty. Specifically, does the reinsurer’s submission to the jurisdiction of the courts take precedence over the right to arbitrate disputes between the parties? Different courts have reached different results, with the different decisions generally being reconcilable based upon varying language in the service of suit and arbitration provisions of different agreements. In Ace Capital Ltd. v. CMS Energy Corporation [2008] EWHC 1843 (Comm. July 30, 2008), the UK Commercial Court held that it does not. The court acknowledged what it characterized as the minority view that the more specific service of suit clause should prevail over a general arbitration clause, where the single issue of the service of suit clause is a “failure . . . to pay” an amount “claimed to be due” under the treaty, and the arbitration clause broadly refers to “any dispute” arising out of the entire contract. However, the court favored an apparent majority view that a service of suit clause is merely an aid to enforcing awards granted to reinsureds through arbitration.

This post written by Brian Perryman.

Allstate applied for a stay of proceedings in a UK Commercial Court action brought by Equitas pending the outcome of arbitration in Texas between Allstate and a non-party, Highlands. The English action concerned the scope of a commutation agreement between, among others, Allstate and Equitas. The agreement was governed by English law and contained an exclusive English jurisdiction clause. The claims in the action – the applicability of the commutation agreement to certain Lloyd’s syndicates’ claimed interests in common account excess of loss reinsurance contracts and whether Highland could recover pursuant to the contracts – were also the subject of the Texas arbitration. This was insufficient to warrant a stay of proceedings, however, principally because of the jurisdiction selection clause. The effect of the clause made English jurisdiction exclusive and mandatory, depriving the court of its common law discretion to stay proceedings in favor of another jurisdiction on classic forum non conveniens grounds. Equitas Limited v. Allstate Insurance Company [2008] EWHC 1671 (Comm. July 17, 2008).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

Royal and Sun Alliance (“R&S”) reinsured liabilities for certain BAE Companies. The parties entered into a Reinsurance agreement which contained a dispute resolution agreement (“DRA”). The DRA provided for English law to be the governing law and referred various disputes to arbitration incorporating the Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA Rules”). A dispute arose, and an arbitration panel made a partial award in favor of BAE. R&S sought to appeal the award to the English Courts on a point of law.

The question that arose was whether section 69 of the UK Arbitration Act of 1996 required an agreement of the parties permitting an appeal, or an agreement of the parties to dispense with the requirement to seek leave of the court. The Court resolved the issue in R&S’s favor as a pure question of construction, holding that Section 69 could not be held to require an agreement between the parties to dispense with the requirement to seek leave of the court. Royal & Sun Alliance Ins. v. BAE Systems, [2008] EWHC 743 (Comm. Apr. 15, 2008).

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.

In a 40 page opinion, the UK Commercial Court considered a situation in which a Venezuelan insurer, Multinacional de Seguros, provided insurance for a producer of liquid aluminum, aluminum ingots and aluminum cylinders. Multinacional obtained reinsurance from three reinsurers. An adjuster was retained to assist in processing claims, and during negotiations with the insured the Venezuelan three year limitation period expired. The Venezuelan Superintendent of Insurance provided an opinion that the limitation period had not expired, but the reinsurers decided to commence a declaratory action in London seeking a declaration that they were not responsible for the losses, and instructed the insurer to take the same position with the insured. Multinacional sent the insured a letter, however, which the Court found waived any potential limitation defense. The Court found that this action breached the cooperation clause of the reinsurance agreements. Lexington Insurance Company v. Multinacional de Seguros, S.A. [2008] EWHC 1170 (Comm. May 23, 2008).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

Seaton Insurance Company and Stonewell Insurance Company are involved in litigation with Cavell USA, owned by British citizen Kenneth Randall, over Cavell’s handling of the run-off of their insurance obligations under an administration agreement. The parties entered into a written settlement of their disputes, and the settlement agreement contained a provision that the settlement “shall be governed by and construed in accordance with English law and the parties submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts.”

After entering into the settlement with Cavell, Seaton and Stonewell initiated arbitration with their reinsurers in the US, National Indemnity Company, and served subpoenas on Cavell. Seaton and Stonewell also sued Cavell in the US, alleging that Cavell fraudulently concealed its intention to delegate claims handling to the reinsurer. Allegations of such wrongdoing had been dismissed from the US arbitration. Cavell filed a motion to dismiss, and contended that any suit should be brought in the UK under the terms of the settlement.

Cavell then separately sued Seaton and Stonewell in the UK, seeking a declaration that all of their disputes had been compromised, and seeking damages resulting from Seaton and Stonewell involving it in the US arbitration and the US lawsuit. Seaton and Stonewell gave notice that they would challenge the jurisdiction of the UK court, and sought a stay of the UK lawsuit pending a decision on the motion to dismiss the US lawsuit they had filed.

The Queen’s Bench Division of the Commercial Court refused the insurance companies’ application for a stay for proceedings, finding that the resolution of the motion to dismiss in the US court would not assist it in resolving the jurisdictional challenge in the UK lawsuit. The court also stated that “it is difficult to see how the defendants can challenge the jurisdiction of this court at that stage.” This case is an interesting example of the interplay between proceedings in different countries. Cavell USA Inc. v. Seaton Ins. Co. [2008] EWHC 876 (April 11, 2008).

This post written by Rollie Goss (with thanks to Jason Morris).

In an August 28, 2007 post, we reported on the decision of the UK Commercial Court granting a permanent injunction against an insurer seeking to challenge a UK arbitration award, which was governed by New York law, in US courts. The UK Court of Appeals has denied an appeal, affirming that decision, in a situation in which: (1) the contract was a Bermuda insurance form; (2) the contract provided that it was governed by New York substantive law; and (3) the contract provided that any arbitration would occur in London, subject to UK arbitration law. The decision turned on the interpretation of the insurance contract, with the Court of Appeals agreeing with the analysis and conclusion of the Commercial Court judge. The Court of Appeal found that disputes as to the confirmation or vacation of an award had to be brought in the UK courts, and that a permanent injunction barring the insurer from challenging the award in US courts was appropriate. C and D [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 (Dec. 5, 2007).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

Following the termination of an underwriting agency agreement, Temple Legal Protection sought to continue managing the run-off of the business originated under the agreement. The other party to the agreement contested the right of Temple to manage the run-off. An arbitrator found that Temple was not entitled to manage the run-off. On appeal, the Commercial Court found that the agreement did not provide a clear answer to the issue, but considering the agreement, custom and practice and other factors, the court concluded that while the arbitrator's analysis was faulty, the correct result had been reached. Temple Legal Protection Limited v. QBE Insurance (Europe) Limited [2008] EWHC 843 (Comm. Apr. 23, 2008).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

Due to the relationships between the UK and US insurance and reinsurance markets, and the fact that different reinsurance agreements in a reinsurance program may involve both UK and US arbitration provisions, there are frequent overlaps between the two jurisdictions when things go awry. In a lengthy opinion, the UK Court of Appeals has engaged in an extensive discussion of the basis for the confidentiality of UK arbitration materials, and the circumstances under which such materials may be disclosed in other proceedings. Noting the strong tradition of confidentiality, the Court noted that exceptions “are still in the process of development on a case-by-case basis,” but that the principal instances in which disclosure may be appropriate are: (1) where there is consent, express or implied; (2) by court order (with courts not having general discretion to waive confidentiality); (3) where reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of an arbitrating party; and (4) where required in the interests of justice, and perhaps the public interest. This may become a very influential opinion in this area of English jurisprudence. Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 184 (Mar. 12, 2008).

This post written by Rollie Goss.