Reinsurance Focus

A disappointed claimant in a FINRA arbitration filed suit under section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in United States District Court to vacate the arbitral award.  The court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The court noted the well established principle that the FAA is not itself a source of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Stating that the parties were not diverse, the court proceeded to evaluate whether it could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction based upon the existence of a federal question.  The plaintiff proposed two bases for federal question jurisdiction: (1) the failure of its opponent to produce certain documents, which it argued constituted a violation of FINRA rules, or a disregard by the panel of FINRA rules; and (2) the fact that the claims pursued in the arbitration included claims under federal securities laws and SEC regulations.  The court rejected both  contentions, finding with respect to the first issue that many courts have held that “manifest disregard” of FINRA or NASD rules do not constitute manifest disregard of federal law for purposes of the FAA.  With respect to the second contention, the court followed a Second Circuit opinion which held that a court may not “look through” the petition to the claims in the underlying arbitration for a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.  The court rejected the argument that jurisdiction was supported by Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), which held that, with respect to petitions to compel arbitration under section 4 of the FAA, courts may look through the petition to determine whether it is predicated on an action that “arises under” federal law. Citing textual differences between sections 4 and 10 of the FAA, the court held that Vaden did not provide support for looking through the petition for purposes of evaluating whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over an action predicted on section 10 of the FAA. Doscher v. Sea Port Group Securities, LLC, Case No. 15-cv-384 (USDC S.D.N.Y. August 5, 2015).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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A reinsurer filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking declaratory relief regarding its obligations under a reinsurance contract on May 7, 2015. The defendants filed an action concerning the same parties, facts, and issues in the District of Connecticut on May 12, 2015. Despite the fact that the Pennsylvania action was filed first, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

On May 1, 2015, the defendants requested payment by May 15th from the reinsurer under the parties’ reinsurance contract and indicated that they would file suit in the District of Connecticut if payment was not timely received. Instead of either paying or responding, the reinsurer filed its complaint for declaratory judgment, preemptively, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The defendants moved to dismiss. Noting that the timing of these events suggested an improper first filing, the Pennsylvania court dismissed the reinsurer’s complaint. Fatal to the reinsurer’s action were the court’s finding that the Pennsylvania filing “was filed in bad faith, as it was improperly anticipatory and solely for declaratory relief.” Additionally, the court found that the reinsurer’s first filed action was merely an “attempt to secure better procedural law by rushing to the [Pennsylvania] courthouse ahead of [the defendants].” Finally, because the defendants were able to establish a nexus between Connecticut and the dispute, and because the plaintiff had improperly “fired the first shot” while the defendants’ pre-litigation demand was pending, the court held that the reinsurer was not entitled to the benefits of the equitable “first-filed” rule. Excalibur Reinsurance Corp v. Select Ins. Co., et al., Case No. 15-2522 (USDC E.D. Pa. July 7, 2015)

This post written by John A. Camp.

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In a case involving a FINRA arbitration between investors and their financial advisor, Judge Anita S. Brody of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that she did not have the jurisdiction to hear a challenge of the arbitration award. Though FINRA rules may be subject to heavy federal regulation and approval by the SEC, the court found that this was not enough to create a federal question to give the court jurisdiction over the challenge. Instead, the court found that under § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, review of an arbitration award with underlying federal questions does not in itself implicate a federal question sufficient for jurisdictional purposes. This is because where there is no merits review, “the substance of the underlying arbitration is generally irrelevant to a district court’s consideration of a motion to vacate.” Instead, the motion to vacate must raise a federal question on its face. The court further held that an argument of manifest disregard of federal law in such an instance was still heard as a claim under § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which is “something of an anomaly in that it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or otherwise.” Accordingly, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Goldman v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., No. 2:12-cv-04469-AB (USDC E.D. Pa. May 19, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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In Walker v. TA Operating, LLC et. al., Case No. 14-41046 (5th Cir. May 22, 2015), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal of an employment discrimination case subject to an arbitration agreement due to lack of jurisdiction. In the underlying case, the district court granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and administratively closed the case because the district court determined that the parties were subject to a valid and applicable arbitration agreement. The district court’s decision was dictated by the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), which grants district courts two powers: 1) the authority to issue an order directing that arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement; and 2) the authority to stay an arbitrable proceeding pending the outcome of the contractually-required arbitration. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the cased due to lack of jurisdiction because an order by the district court administratively closing a case is tantamount to a stay, and bars appellate review. The Fifth Circuit explained that a district court has jurisdiction over final decisions of the district court and that Congress explicitly provided that appellate courts lack jurisdiction over a district court order granting a stay of any action under section 3 of the FAA or directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of the FAA.

This post written by Kelly A. Cruz-Brown.

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In late April, a district court in New York granted plaintiff Utica Mutual Insurance Company’s (“Utica”) motion to remand, implicating the voluntary-involuntary removal rule. Utica originally filed a breach of contract lawsuit against defendant American Re-Insurance Company (“American”). The lawsuit also named as co-defendant, Transatlantic Reinsurance Company (“Transatlantic”), a corporation domiciled and with a principal place of business in New York. American was initially unable to remove the case to federal court due to lack of diversity among the co-defendants.

A New York state court severed the claims against American and Transatlantic, thereby eliminating the diversity impediment for removal. Utica argued that “removability can only be created by Utica’s voluntary conduct,” and not by the court’s involuntary severance order. American argued that the voluntary-involuntary rule’s fraudulent misjoinder exception applied, as Transatlantic was improperly joined. The court found—citing second circuit precedent—that an action was not removable when non-diverse parties were made diverse by a court’s involuntary severance order. The voluntary-involuntary rule was designed to “protect against the possibility that a party might secure a reversal on appeal in state court of the non-diverse party’s dismissal, producing renewed lack of complete diversity in the state court action….in order to be removable, be one which could have been brought in federal court in the first instance.” The case turned on whether the order was final, and not simply voluntary.

As Utica’s severance order appeal was not yet final, a requirement under the voluntary-involuntary rule, the district court remanded the case back to the New York State Supreme Court. The court noted that American’s fraudulent misjoinder claim was “time barred” as defendants failed to file within thirty days after receipt. The court also noted that American understood “Utica’s motivation for joining Transatlantic and [American] as defendants in the same action,” an admission that went against their claim for fraudulent misjoinder.

Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Re-Ins. Co., No. 6:14-CV-1558 (USDC N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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A New York federal court remanded a reinsurance dispute to state court, based on the defendant’s waiver of its right to remove. Plaintiff R&Q Reinsurance Company (“R&Q”) brought an action against Allianz Insurance Company (“Allianz”) regarding a dispute as to R&Q’s indemnity obligations to Allianz under two reinsurance contracts. Allianz timely removed the action, as it met all the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction. However, R&Q moved to remand, based on the fact that Allianz had already answered and counterclaimed in state court, and had therefore waived its right to remove. The court agreed, granting the remand, finding that Allianz’s counterclaims, which sought affirmative relief, constituted a voluntary submission to the state court’s jurisdiction. The court denied R&Q’s bid for attorney’s fees, however, finding that Allianz had a reasonable basis on which to remove, particularly given that the action otherwise met the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. R&Q Reinsurance Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., Case No. 15-00166 (USDC S.D.N.Y. March 20, 2015)

This post written by Catherine Acree.

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The Third Circuit recently ruled that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting an unregistered businesses from maintaining any “action or proceeding” in any court in the state interferes with the enforcement of arbitration awards and therefore is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. The plaintiff was a non-registered company, but the parties had agreed that the arbitration could proceed and be administered under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The district court confirmed the arbitration award, and the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the FAA preempted application of the law because it rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable, noting that the intent of Congress in enacting the FAA was to promote arbitration. Therefore, the Pennsylvania statute, by barring any “action or proceeding,” interfered with the enforceability of the FAA and therefore was preempted.

The issue of state statutes interfering with the enforcement of arbitration awards has been a subject of Reinsurance Focus blogs numerous times. Particularly, courts have examined state statutes that require the posting of security before a non-admitted company may file suit in that state. We will continue to monitor case law addressing whether other courts find that the FAA pre-empts similar pre-pleading security statutes.

Generational Equity LLC v. Schomaker, No. 14-1291 (3d Cir. Feb. 23, 2015).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

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On November 18, 2014, we reported on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Pine Top Receivables of Illinois, LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, in which Pine Top claimed that Banco de Seguros owed it $2,352,464.08 under certain reinsurance contracts.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying Pine Top’s motion to compel arbitration, agreeing that Pine Top’s assigned rights under the reinsurance contracts were limited to the collections of certain debts and did not include the right to arbitrate.  The Seventh Circuit also had affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion to strike Banco Seguros’s pleading for failure to post security, holding that such pre-judgment security is a form of attachment that violates the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.  On December 22, 2014, the Seventh Circuit denied Pine Top’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, as no judge requested a vote on the petition, and the judges on the prior panel voted to deny rehearing.  Pine Top Receivables of Illinois, LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, No. 13–1364 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2014).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has dismissed, for lack of appellate jurisdiction, a district court order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Certain Underwriters of Lloyds of London and several other insurance companies. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s order was not a final, appealable order within the meaning of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or the Federal Arbitration Act. The district court had granted the motion after finding the insurance contract at issue contained a clear and unambiguous arbitration clause, and had then stayed the case and closed it for administrative purposes. The Fifth Circuit found the district court’s order and administrative closure lacked the finality necessary for appellate jurisdiction, noting a “clear distinction” between final orders dismissing cases after compelling arbitration and interlocutory orders staying and administratively closing cases pending arbitration. The district court’s order was deemed to be the latter and the appeal was therefore dismissed. Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, No. 13-31130 (5th Cir. Nov. 24, 2014).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

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The Second Circuit refused to hear an appeal in an action brought by Acumen Re Management Corporation, an underwriter, against a reinsurer, General Security National Insurance Company. The crux of the action was Acumen’s allegation that General Security breached the agreement between them by failing to pay Acumen certain commissions which General Security allegedly owed under the parties’ agreement. In the suit, Acumen alleged five distinct theories as to how General Security breached the agreement. The lower court entered partial summary judgment in favor of General Security on four of those theories and further held that, under all five theories, no more than nominal damages were available to Acumen. The lower court certified the partial final summary judgment as to the four counts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) which authorizes, under certain circumstances, entry of a partial final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims of the parties such that the partial final judgment becomes reviewable on appeal. The Second Circuit determined that the five theories Acumen alleged were not separate and distinct claims; instead, Acumen alleged five various ways in which General Security breached the agreement and the claims were interrelated and dependent upon each other. The Second Circuit concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review the lower court’s entry of partial summary judgment. Acumen Re Management Corp. v. General Security National Insurance Co., No. 12‐5081‐cv (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 2014).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

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