Reinsurance Focus

Following the rejection by a Florida jury of all claims made by Instituto Nacional de Seguros (as we reported on July 9, 2014), a Costa Rican insurer, against two reinsurance brokers, Hemispheric Reinsurance Group and Howden Insurance Brokers, the trial court entered final judgment in defendants’ favor. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. It entered judgment in the amount of $3,134,459.30, which included an award of $2,456.131.10 for attorneys’ fees, $497,469.32 for taxable costs, $96,297.00 for expert fees, and $84,561.98 for prejudgment interest. Instituto Nacional de Seguros v. Hemispheric Reinsurance Group, Case No. 10-33-653 CA 04 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 5, 2015).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

See our disclaimer.

A California federal district court granted in part and denied in part various motions involving Star Insurance’s action seeking to rescind an insurance policy based upon certain alleged material misrepresentations concerning the nature of the insured’s business. The insured, Sunwest Metals, Inc., incurred substantial damage to its property following an arson fire. After Star advanced certain benefits to Sunwest, Star sued to rescind the policy based upon certain alleged misrepresentations which Sunwest, through its agent, made on the insurance application which underreported the percentage of income from Sunwest’s recycling business. The parties did not dispute that the misrepresentations were false. In defense, Sunwest argued the misrepresentations were unintentional and not material. Sunwest counterclaimed against Star and cross-claimed against its agent as well as against Star’s surplus lines broker, G. J. Sullivan. The parties cross-moved for judgment.

First, the court denied Sunwest’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, rejecting Sunwest’s argument that Star was required to plead and prove that Sunwest’s intentionally mispresented the income from its recycling operations on the aapplication. As a matter of law, California law allows an insurer to rescind a policy based upon an insured’s negligent or intentional concealment or misrepresentation of a material fact.

Next, the court denied in part Star’s motion for summary judgment. Sunwest raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether Star had inquiry notice of the misrepresentations. Specifically, Star’s underwriters had seen Sunwest’s website which prominently displayed Sunwest’s recycling business and reviewed a report which should have put it on notice to further investigate Sunwest’s annual revenue breakdown. Moreover, because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to when Star should have been on notice of Sunwest’s actual income, the court determined that genuine issues of material fact also existed as to whether or not Star waived the misrepresentation by allegedly unduly delaying its rescission. While it agreed with Sunwest that genuine issues of material fact existed as to inquiry notice and waiver, the court found as a matter of law that the misrepresentations were indeed material.

Finally, the Court granted Sullivan’s motion for summary judgment. The parties did not dispute Sullivan acted as Star’s agent. The issue became whether Sullivan acted in a capacity as a dual agent which could have given rise to a cause of action by Sunwest against Sullivan. The court rejected Sunwest’s argument, finding that a reasonable jury could only conclude that Sullivan was not a dual agent. Star Insurance Co. v. Sunwest Metals, Inc., Case No. SACV 13-1930 DOC(DFMx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2014).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

See our disclaimer.

We have posted on this case filed against two reinsurance brokers several times.  Since our last posting regarding this case, which reported on the results of the trial, an appeal was filed in Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal.  The appeal has been dismissed pursuant to a joint stipulation. Instituto Nacional de Seguros v. Hemispheric Reinsurance Group, LLC, No. 3D14-1590 (Fla. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2014).

This post written by Kelly A. Cruz-Brown.

See our disclaimer.

An upper tribunal in the United Kingdom has dismissed an appeal brought by Westinsure, an alliance of brokers formed to provide introductions and improve the business terms of its members, where Westinsure argued its services were tax exempt under a VAT Directive. That Directive exempts insurance and reinsurance transactions including “related services performed by insurance brokers and insurance agents.” The issue was whether Westinsure, which provides its member brokers commercial buying power, regulatory compliance assistance, and other business support, acts as a broker or agent when supplying these services. The tribunal found Westinsure’s services are not of a broker or agent and therefore not exempt under the VAT Directive or the Value Added Tax Act of 1994 (VATA). The tribunal further found that while Westinsure’s services are related to the supply of insurance, they did not have a sufficiently close connection to the insurance transactions themselves to come within the VAT exemption. Westinsure Group Ltd. v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, [2014] UKUT 00452 (TCC) Appeal No. FTC/96/2013 (Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) Oct. 13, 2014).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

See our disclaimer.

A federal district court has dismissed all claims brought against American Special Risk (ASR), a reinsurance intermediary and agent for insurer Signet, by insured Car Sense. Car Sense sued Signet and ASR in connection with a Buy Back Guarantee program that Signet offered as a way to increase customer participation in certain incentive programs offered by Car Sense. Signet represented that the BBG program was 100% secured via a reinsurance agreement with Hannover Re. ASR acted as Signet’s reinsurance intermediary and agent in negotiating and procuring the reinsurance agreement. As alleged, though Signet represented that the BBG was a legitimate insurance product, the BBG was in fact a fraudulent scheme engineered to generate one-time fees. Moreover, the reinsurance agreement did not provide for 100% security of the BBG as Signet represented but was, in fact, illusory. Car Sense sued Signet and ASR for various claims ranging from breach of contract to fraud.

The court dismissed all claims against ASR finding, in large part, that ASR did not owe any duty, and had not made any misrepresentations, to Car Sense. The court also gave notice of its intention to dismiss all claims against Signet for Car Sense’s failure to serve Signet within the time required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Car Sense, Inc. v. American Special Risk, LLC, No. 13-CV-5661 (USDC E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2014).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

See our disclaimer.

In what began as a dispute between OneBeacon America Insurance Company and its insured, Colgate, over OneBeacon’s asserted right to control the defense of claims against Colgate in connection with numerous personal injury suits, Colgate sued OneBeacon’s reinsurer, National Indemnity Company (“NICO), and its affiliated claims adjuster, Resolute Management. Colgate alleged that OneBeacon’s contractual relationship with NICO and Resolute created a conflict of interest because they served a dual role as both OneBeacon’s reinsurer and the claims adjuster under those policies. Colgate wanted to defend the actions against it, while NICO and Resolute wanted to settle the cases to minimize the legal expenses.

Colgate sued NICO and Resolute under several theories, including declaratory relief, breach of contract, tortious interference, breach of the implied covenant of fair dealing, and a statutory claim under Massachusetts law for unfair deceptive conduct. After the lower court only partially dismissed these claims, NICO and Resolute appealed. The appellate court dismissed all claims against NICO and Resolute. Central to the court’s ruling was the absence of a contract between Colgate and NICO or between Colgate and Resolute. Moreover, the agreement between NICO and Resolute provided that the agreement could not be assigned and that it did not confer any rights on third parties. Absent contractual privity or an assigment, Colgate could not assert any claims against NICO or Resolute despite their dual roles as OneBeacon’s reinsurer and Colgate’s claims administrator. OneBeacon America Insurance Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive, Index No. 651193/11 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 28, 2014).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

See our disclaimer.

We previously reported on the decision in Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. FDIC, where the federal district court rejected claims of privilege, work product, and the common interest doctrine to certain information disclosed by an insurer to its reinsurers and broker. In a Special Focus article titled “IS IT STILL PRIVILEGED? AN INSURER’S DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO ITS REINSURERS AND BROKERS WAIVES PRIVILEGE … SOMETIMES,” Renee Schimkat discusses Progressive Casualty (including another more recent order in that case) and other decisions where courts have considered whether the disclosure of information between these three parties waives applicable privileges.

This post written by Renee Schimkat.
See our disclaimer.

On March 26, 2014, we reported on a dispute surrounding whether a cedent was responsible to compensate a reinsurance broker under a particular broker authorization agreement. The court had denied summary judgment, finding that the agreement was ambiguous in that one provision required the reinsurer to pay the broker, while a separate provision implied that it was the cedent’s responsibility to do so. On June 27, 2014, the court entered an order dismissing the case based on an unopposed motion informing the court of the parties’ settlement. Global Risk Intermediary, LLC v. Aetna Global Benefits Ltd., Case No. 4:13-CV-0133 (USDC W.D. Ark. June 27, 2014).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

See our disclaimer.

In a case involving alleged broker malpractice with respect to certain underinsured business interruption losses under a commercial property insurance policy, the New York high court reversed a lower appellate court’s affirmance of summary judgment in favor of the insurance broker. The court found that the evidence suggested that “there was some interaction regarding a question of business interruption coverage, with the insured relying on the expertise of the agent,” where the insured testified that (1) she and the broker discussed the coverage, (2) the broker requested sales figures and other data, (3) the broker assured the insured that the coverage was adequate, and (4) the broker repeatedly pledged to review coverage annually and recommend adjustments as the insured’s businesses grew. The court also reversed the intermediate court’s majority view that the insured’s knowledge of the coverage limits warranted dismissal. The court explained that, where a special relationship existed, “it is wholly irrelevant whether [the insured was] aware of the limits that were actually procured.” Voss v. Netherlands Insurance Co., Case No. 11 (N.Y. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2014).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

See our disclaimer.

A federal district court in Arkansas recently examined provisions of a Broker Authorization Agreement between a reinsurance broker (Global Risk) and a ceding insurer (Aetna). In denying cross-motions for summary judgment on the broker’s breach of contract claim, the court concluded that the agreement contained arguably contradictory provisions regarding who was responsible for paying the broker. One provision expressly placed the responsibility for payment of the broker’s services with the reinsurer (not a party to the Broker Authorization Agreement), while a separate provision addressed Global Risk’s entitlement to be compensated in the event that the agreement was terminated or the reinsurance portfolio was transferred. The court concluded that the agreement was ambiguous because “[i]f [the ceding insurer] had no responsibility to compensate [the reinsurance broker], then these latter provisions would be meaningless. That they are included in the contract between [the reinsurance broker] and [the ceding insurer] suggests that [the ceding insurer] has an obligation to compensate [the reinsurance broker].” Global Risk Intermediary, LLC v. Aetna Global Benefits Ltd., Case No. 4:13-CV-0133 (USDC W.D. Ark. Mar. 12, 2014).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

See our disclaimer.