Reinsurance Focus

Affirming a district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held unenforceable a provision of an employment agreement mandating that wage-and-hour claims could be brought only through individual arbitration and that employees waived “the right to participate in or receive money or any other relief from any class, collective, or representative proceeding.”  The provision further provided that  if the waiver provision was unenforceable, “any claim brought on a class, collective, or representative action basis must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction.”  Employees were not permitted to opt out of this provision; it was a requirement of continued employment.  The Court found the waiver of collective action prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), and rejected the contention that the case involved any conflict between the NLRA and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  This decision appears to conflict with decisions of the Second, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, laying the potential basis for the review of this issue by the Supreme Court.

The Court found that the contractual waiver of the right to proceed in a collective manner was an unlawful restriction of the exercise by the employee of the right to collective action protected by section 7 of the NLRA, a right it termed substantive and”at the heart” of the purpose of the NLRA rather than a procedural right.  Addressing the employer’s contrary interpretation of section 7, the Court found persuasive interpretations of the scope of the protections of section 7 by the National Labor Relations Board, which the Court found to be “a sensible way to understand the statutory language, and thus we must follow it.”

The Court then rejected the employer’s assertion that the case involved a conflict between the NLRA, as it interpreted it, and the FAA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.  The Court reasoned that since the contractual provision at issue is unlawful under section 7 of the NLRA, “it is illegal, and meets the criteria of the FAA’s savings clause for nonenforcement.”  The FAA’s savings clause provides that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Stating that finding the NLRA in conflict with the FAA “would render the FAA’s savings clause a nullity,” the Court rejected that its decision created a Circuit split, contending that none of the opinions from the other four Circuits “has engaged substantively with the relevant arguments.”  Despite this disclaimer, it appears that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion does conflict with the decisions of other Circuits, and accords the FAA a different role and emphasis than do the opinions of other Circuits. Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., No. 15-2997 (7th Cir. May 26, 2016).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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A disappointed claimant in a FINRA arbitration filed suit under section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in United States District Court to vacate the arbitral award.  The court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The court noted the well established principle that the FAA is not itself a source of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Stating that the parties were not diverse, the court proceeded to evaluate whether it could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction based upon the existence of a federal question.  The plaintiff proposed two bases for federal question jurisdiction: (1) the failure of its opponent to produce certain documents, which it argued constituted a violation of FINRA rules, or a disregard by the panel of FINRA rules; and (2) the fact that the claims pursued in the arbitration included claims under federal securities laws and SEC regulations.  The court rejected both  contentions, finding with respect to the first issue that many courts have held that “manifest disregard” of FINRA or NASD rules do not constitute manifest disregard of federal law for purposes of the FAA.  With respect to the second contention, the court followed a Second Circuit opinion which held that a court may not “look through” the petition to the claims in the underlying arbitration for a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.  The court rejected the argument that jurisdiction was supported by Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), which held that, with respect to petitions to compel arbitration under section 4 of the FAA, courts may look through the petition to determine whether it is predicated on an action that “arises under” federal law. Citing textual differences between sections 4 and 10 of the FAA, the court held that Vaden did not provide support for looking through the petition for purposes of evaluating whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over an action predicted on section 10 of the FAA. Doscher v. Sea Port Group Securities, LLC, Case No. 15-cv-384 (USDC S.D.N.Y. August 5, 2015).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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A lawsuit filed in the United States Court for the District of Connecticut between Odyssey Reinsurance Company and Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corporation involves a dispute over commission payments in a reinsurance scheme with State National Insurance Company, Inc. According to Odyssey, Cal-Regent has not made the appropriate commission payments for 2003 to 2007. According to Cal-Regent, however, Odyssey failed to perform the contracts and Cal-Regent is entitled to a set-off. In its complaint, Odyssey alleged that it “has performed all of its obligations under the Reinsurance Agreement” and had performed all conditions precedent to bringing suit. Odyssey moved for summary judgment, and Cal-Regent argued that Odyssey was not entitled to summary judgment, among other reasons, because of the dispute over whether the Odyssey had first breached the reinsurance contracts. However, in its answer to Odyssey’s complaint, Cal-Regent had the burden “to deny Odyssey’s performance with particularity, which Cal-Regent failed to do.” Rather than granting summary judgment to Odyssey on this issue, the court issued a decision allowing Cal-Regent to amend its answer and affirmative defenses, including granting leave to add an affirmative defense of material breach.

In another decision issued on the same day, however, the court dismissed Cal-Regent’s counterclaim for a setoff, finding that it had been brought under Connecticut law, rather than Texas law, when the parties had agreed to Texas law in the reinsurance agreement. Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corp., No. 3:14-cv-00458-VAB (USDC D. Conn. Aug. 20, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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The NAIC’s Reinsurance Task Force has been active of late, exposing six different drafts for comment.

Certified Reinsurers

The Reinsurance Financial Analysis (E) Working Group (ReFAWG) developed the Uniform Application Checklist for Certified Reinsurers to help ensure that a reinsurer’s application for certification is complete under the requirements of the Credit for Reinsurance Models. The Checklist also facilitates the “passporting” process, whereby a state has the discretion to defer to another state’s certification and rating of a reinsurer. This latest draft of the Checklist makes changes to the section addressing “Disputed and/or Overdue Reinsurance Claims/Business Practices.” In February 2015, ReFAWG instructed staff to prepare this now-exposed memorandum outlining the group’s responsibilities relating to certified reinsurers and the passporting process.

The comment deadline for these two items is September 15, 2015.

Credit for Reinsurance – XXX/AXXX

Having been charged with creating a new model regulation to establish requirements regarding the reinsurance of XXX/AXXX life insurance policies, the Reinsurance (E) Task Force exposed the draft Non-Universal Life and Universal Life With Secondary Guarantees Credit for Reinsurance Model Regulation. The Task Force also exposed two options for revisions to the Credit for Reinsurance Model Law (#785) to authorize adoption of this new model regulation, Option 1 and Option 2. Key topics that emerged in the drafting of the new model regulation are discussed in an exposed memorandum from its drafting group.

The comment deadline for these four items is September 30, 2015.

This post written by Anthony Cicchetti.

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On August 26, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court had appointment authority under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Overturning a prior order that denied Odyssey Reinsurance Company’s (Odyssey) motion to appoint, the Second Circuit found that the trial court not only had the authority to appoint an arbitration umpire but “the obligation to appoint an umpire to correct a breakdown in the umpire selection process.”

The trial court found that it did not need to intervene in a dispute over worker’s compensation billings. The Second Circuit Court disagreed, finding the parties deadlocked as to the interpretation of various terms in the arbitration agreement concerning umpire qualifications. This “lapse” therefore necessitated the trial court to appoint an arbitration umpire.

Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London Syndicate 53, No. 14-2840-cv (2nd Cir. Aug. 26, 2015)

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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In a dispute involving an earlier arbitration ordering American United Life Insurance Company (“AUL”) to make a commutation payment to The Travelers Indemnity, the parties filed cross petitions for arbitration pursuant to different clauses of a reinsurance contract. AUL argued arbitration should proceed pursuant to the Article 16 in the contract requiring all disputes between the company and the reinsurer be submitted to arbitration. It further argued that Travelers had forfeited its right to name umpire candidates, and that the court should appoint an umpire from the names submitted by AUL. Travelers, for its part, argued that the matter should proceed pursuant to Article 6 of the contract that required actuaries to make the determination concerning the amount of the loss.

The Court sided with AUL stating that an arbitration panel needed to decide the threshold issue of whether the matter should proceed pursuant to Article 16 or Article 6. The court reasoned that in order to determine whether to proceed by a panel of actuaries, the reinsurance contract had to be interpreted and that Article 16 was clear that “any dispute between the Company and the Reinsurer arising out of, or relating to the formation, interpretation, performance or breach of this Contract, whether such dispute arises before or after termination of this Contract, shall be submitted to arbitration.” Regarding AUL’s request that the court appoint an umpire from its list of candidates, the court noted that the parties were engaged in settlement discussions and Travelers had offered to name umpire candidates but AUL never responded. Based on this, the court held that Travelers never knowingly waived its right to name umpire candidates, and ordered Travelers to comply with Article 16. American United Life Insurance Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., et al., Case No. 3:14-cv-1339 (USDC D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2015).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

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The Ninth Circuit held that an arbitration agreement between Opus Bank and its former executive vice president Carey Brennan should be interpreted under federal, not state, law unless the parties unambiguously agreed otherwise. While Brennan’s employment contract contained a California choice-of law clause, his arbitration agreement required any employment-related dispute be resolved “by binding arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association.” Brennan argued that the arbitration agreement’s clause was substantively and procedurally unconscionable, while Opus moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that because the contract involves interstate commerce, the FAA applies. Further, because the arbitration agreement, did not incorporate California law expressly, federal law applies. “While the Employment Agreement is clear that California’s procedural rules, rights, and remedies apply during arbitration, it says nothing about whether California’s law governs the question whether certain disputes are to be submitted to arbitration in the first place. Further, the incorporation of the AAA rules constituted “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties intended to have an arbitrator decide the threshold question of arbitrability. Brennan v. Opus Bank, Nos. 13-35580, 13-35598 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2015).

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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A federal district court in New York entered an order enjoining an attempt at a second arbitration initiated by Equitas Insurance Limited and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London against Arrowood Indemnity Company. The second attempt at arbitration comes after five years of dispute, which resulted in a $45 million arbitration award in favor of Arrowood. After the arbitral award and a court order confirming the award, the Underwriters filed a motion for post-judgment discovery and relief from judgment based on a document that the Underwriters had obtained in another proceeding against Arrowood that purportedly showed the disingenuity of Arrowood’s stance in the arbitration. The court denied the motion, finding that such a motion “cannot be used to collaterally attack an arbitration award for misconduct in the arbitration in the guise of an attack on the judgment confirming it.” Following the court’s order, the Underwriters demanded a second arbitration. In response, Arrowood filed a motion seeking to enforce the court’s earlier order.

The court held that Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides “the exclusive means of addressing and redressing wrongdoing in an arbitration proceeding” and that any such grounds must be raised within three months of the award. Finding that the Underwriters’ second attempt at arbitration was “in direct contravention of the FAA” and that a second arbitration cannot be used to undo the award of the first, the court enjoined the Underwriters’ attempts at a second arbitration—perhaps bringing the dispute to a conclusion. Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. Equitas Insurance Limited, No. 1:13-cv-07680-DLC (USDC S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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In a Special Focus article Rollie Goss previews another arbitration case coming before the United States Supreme Court involving the issue of whether a class arbitration waiver is unconscionable, and the impact of such a finding on the viability of the agreement to arbitrate.

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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The Fourth Circuit considered whether an arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by failing to find actual damages and failing to award sufficient attorney’s fees against certain non-profit credit repair companies, despite the arbitrator’s finding that the companies had made inadequate disclosures under the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA). Regarding damages, the arbitrator had determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to “amount[s] paid” under the CROA as damages, because plaintiffs made “voluntary contributions” to the non-profit credit repair organizations, rather than actual payments contemplated within the meaning of the CROA. The Fourth Circuit held that, given the absence of binding precedent requiring a contrary interpretation of the CROA, the arbitrator’s ruling “did not constitute a refusal to heed a clearly defined legal principle.” The court further noted that it was not for it “to pass judgment on the strength of the arbitrator’s chosen rationale.” Similarly, with respect to the arbitrator’s ruling on attorney’s fees, the Fourth Circuit held that while “it may be debatable whether the arbitrator performed [the] task ‘well,’ the record in this case shows that the arbitrator undertook a careful analysis of the applicable legal principles and reached a decision supported by his interpretation of our precedent.” In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit considered certain U.S. Supreme Court rulings in making clear that the “limited review” of an arbitration award is appropriate even when “the arbitrator considered remedies created by statute, rather than rights established by contract.” Jones, et al. v. Dancel, et al., Case No. 14-2160 (4th Cir. July 6, 2015).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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