Reinsurance Focus

A New York district court granted Hudson Specialty Insurance Company’s (“Hudson”) petition to compel arbitration against New Jersey Transit Corporation (“N.J. Transit”) after determining that the parties had agreed to arbitrate pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy damaged N.J. Transit’s facilities and equipment triggering policies issued by Hudson and various other property casualty insurance companies. The original action was submitted to New Jersey state court to interpret “Flood Sublimit” and “Named Windstorm” provisions in the policies, the former of which limited Hudson’s flood damage liability to $100 million. Hudson sought to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision within the policy. N.J. Transit argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable as it never assented to the provision, and furthermore, never saw the arbitration provision until the policy was issued. It alleged that they relied on a prior draft of the policy without such a provision.

The court rejected N.J. Transit’s arguments for a number of reasons. The arbitration provision was included in the policy quote accepted by Hudson’s insurance broker, which referenced arbitration. The court noted that N.J. Transit “cannot have it both ways.” Either N.J. Transit assented to the policy in 2012 or it did not. Instead, “N.J. Transit is clearly seeking to benefit from the Policy by demanding coverage for its losses after Hurricane Sandy and has thus manifested its assent.” The court also rejected N.J. Transit’s final effort to oppose arbitration alleging that the provision was unenforceable because it lacked certain key terms. Here, the arbitration provision was a complete form where the alleged missing terms had no bearing on the enforceability of the provision. Hudson Specialty Ins. Co. v. N.J. Transit Corp., No. 15-cv-89 (ER) (USDC S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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Gardner Denver, Inc. (“Gardner”), had entered into a settlement agreement with its liability insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (“NUF”) to resolve a dispute over Gardner’s coverage under various indemnity agreements. NUF honored the settlement agreement for several years, paying Gardner’s claims. However, once NUF entered into a “retroactive reinsurance” agreement with National Indemnity Company (“NICO”), in which NICO assumed NUF’s obligations and liabilities, NICO delegated the claims handling to another entity, which asserted a coverage defense and ceased paying Gardner’s claims under the settlement agreement. Gardner sued NICO and the claims administrator for tortious interference with a contract, and NICO countered with a motion to dismiss. NICO contended that the tortious interference claim failed because NICO had a qualified privilege as NUF’s agent (similar to the protection afforded to corporate officers under the “business judgment” rule) to handle claims on behalf of NUF. The trial court agreed with NICO and found that the complaint failed to overcome the privilege by sufficiently alleging that NICO acted without justification and with malice, and dismissed the case.

The appellate court, however, reversed the dismissal, holding that it was a factual question whether NICO’s actions were in fact unjustified or malicious, based on interpretation of the underlying insurance and settlement agreements and other evidence not before court, and thus it was not a decision for the court to resolve on a motion to dismiss. “Until the court answers whether NICO’s defense was frivolous, it could not determine whether NICO acted in good faith or, alternatively, acted without justification or malice, in its failure to pay claims pursuant to the settlement agreement.” Gardner Denver, Inc. v. National Indemnity Co., et al., Case No. 4-14-0713 (Ill. App. Ct. May 21, 2015).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

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An administrative law judge for the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) found in favor of Talina Torres (“Torres”) against Employers Resource (“Employers”) after determining that an arbitration clause within an employment contract was unenforceable. From September 2009 until June 2011, Torres was employed by Beth’s Kitchen, Inc., which was staffed by Employers. Torres filed a wage and hour putative class action lawsuit in California state court after being laid-off. Employers was named as a co-defendant. Employers then successfully moved to compel individual arbitration arguing that, under Stolt-Nielsen, class arbitration may not be inferred when a contract is silent on the issue. Following this ruling, Torres filed a complaint with the Board contending that Employers restricted her rights to engage in “protected concerted activities” as an employee under the National Labor Relations Act, citing recent Board decisions Murphy Oil and D.R. Horton.

In response to the Board complaint, Employers made various arguments, including that the Board lacked standing to hear the case as Torres was not an employee of Employers. Employers further contended that, contrary to the facts in Murphy Oil and D.R. Horton, the employment agreement in this case was not mandatory as a condition of employment with Beth’s Kitchen. The Board, however, found that while Torres did not interact with Employers, Employers did prepare the employment agreement for Beth’s Kitchen, Employers made itself a party to the agreement, and Employers then relied on the agreement in the litigation. Therefore, Employers was sufficiently implicated as violating Torres’s rights under the NLRA. The Board also noted that based on various representations made by Employers and Beth’s Kitchen, Torres was led to believe that the employment agreement was mandatory as a condition of employment. The Board ordered that Employers rescind or revise the mandatory arbitration provision and also that they not oppose Torres’ class action wage and hour suit on the basis of the employment agreement. Employers Resource and Talina Torres, Case 31-CA-097189 (N.L.R.B. May 18, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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We previously posted on a district court’s dismissal, with prejudice, of an Amended Complaint challenging the propriety of payments to the ceding insurer of the Mariah Re catastrophe bond which exhausted the cat bond’s trust account.  The Amended Complaint contended that the payment amount had not been calculated in accordance with the provisions of the cat bond’s documents, and that a lesser amount, which would not have exhausted the trust account, should have been paid instead.  The district court found that the documents clearly set forth the process for calculating the payment amount, and that the payment amount had been calculated in accordance with the contractual agreements.  It therefore dismissed the case with prejudice.  The Court of Appeal, after briefly describing the contractual relationships, simply stated that “[w]e AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for substantially the reasons stated by Judge Sullivan in his opinion of September 30, 2013.”  This result demonstrates the importance of clarity in the drafting of cat bond documents, and may help to reduce whatever uncertainty this lawsuit engendered in the cat bond market.  Mariah Re Limited v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, No. 14-4062 (2nd Cir. June 30, 2015).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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Plaintiff Excalibur Reinsurance Corporation (“Excalibur”) sought a preliminary injunction in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to enjoin Defendants Select Insurance Company and the Travelers Indemnity Company from proceeding with litigation on the same issues in the District of Connecticut. Excalibur argued that without the injunction, it would need to post security in the Connecticut action, an action that would deplete its corporate assets and seriously affect its liquidity. The district court, however, denied Excalibur’s preliminary injunction because it found that Excalibur would not be “irreparably harmed” if the request were denied. The court found that Excalibur would recover posted funds in Connecticut if it prevailed. It also noted that a sworn statement by its Assistant Vice President was insufficient evidence to demonstrate the potential injury the company faced from posting security in two different matters.

Excalibur Reinsurance Corp. v. Select Ins. Comp., No. 15-2522 (USDC E.D. PA. June 2, 2015)

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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In a Special Focus article, Renee Schimkat discusses recent law on the discoverability of reinsurance-related information in non-reinsurance matters:
“Is There Rhyme or Reason to the Scope of Permissible Reinsurance-Related Discovery?”

This post written by Renee Schimkat.
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The Middle District of Florida recently granted in part and denied in part plaintiff Stewart Title Guaranty Company’s (“Stewart Title”) motion to dismiss defendant First American Title Insurance Company’s (“First American”) counterclaim for breach of the utmost duty of good faith. As noted in a prior post, this case involves disputes regarding reinsurance agreements that First American entered into with Old Republic National Title Insurance Company (“Old Republic”) and Stewart Title. In these agreements, Old Republic and Stewart Title agreed to assume part of First American’s contractual liability under a title insurance policy.

When mechanic’s liens were discovered on the property at issue, First American negotiated a $41 million settlement of the claim before turning to Old Republic and Stewart Title to pay their proportionate share of that sum. While Old Republic paid under its reservation of rights, Stewart Title chose not to pay, and instead, sued First American for rescission, reformation, declaratory judgment, and negligence. First American countersued Stewart Title for breach of contract, breach of the utmost duty of good faith, and declaratory judgment.

Stewart Title moved to dismiss First American’s counterclaim for breach of the utmost duty of good faith on the same bases as a prior dismissal granted in favor of Old Republic. First American contended that Stewart Title’s breach of the reinsurance agreement differed from Old Republic’s alleged breach in that Stewart Title did not pay under its reservation of rights. First American’s counterclaim alleged that Stewart Title breached the utmost duty of good faith in the following four ways: (1) failing to pay the claim as required under the insurance contract; (2) engaging in delay tactics; (3) using First American’s documents against it in support of its allegations and preemptively filing suit against First American; and (4) accusing First American of making misrepresentations and omissions. While the district court held that the first two claims necessarily could be tied to breach of the reinsurance contract, the latter two claims could not and, consequently, the latter two were dismissed.

Old Republic Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. First American Title Ins. Co., No. 8:15-cv-126-T-30EAJ, 2015 WL 1530611 (USDC M.D. Fla. June 8, 2015)

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion for attorneys’ fees and enhancement of fees resulting from post-arbitration confirmation proceedings. The issue before the court was whether the agreement between Crossville Medical Oncology and Glenwood Systems permitted the court to award the additional attorneys’ fees.

Crossville Medical Oncology and its single shareholder Dr. Tabor sued Glenwood Systems for breach of contract. The agreement was determined to have an enforceable arbitration clause, and following arbitration, Dr. Tabor was found to have signed the agreement in his individual capacity and to have breached. After an interlocutory appeal regarding Dr. Tabor’s personal consent to arbitration, the district court entered a judgment confirming the arbitration award. Glenwood moved for attorneys’ fees resulting from the post-arbitration litigation proceedings, which the district court denied for lack of authority.

The appellate court affirmed, finding that neither the Federal Arbitration Act nor the parties’ agreement authorized the court to grant attorneys’ fees for post-arbitration confirmation proceedings. The court reasoned that it could only award attorneys’ fees if it was authorized by statute or by the specific language of the parties’ agreement. While the agreement subjected “[a]ny dispute arising out of or in connection with” the agreement to arbitration and provided for attorneys’ fees for the prevailing party, the only jurisdiction given to the courts in the agreement was to “enter [the award] as a judgment.” The court construed the agreement to authorize “an arbitrator to award attorneys’ fees and costs during arbitration,” but merely authorized “the district court to enter the award as a judgment.” The court distinguished the case from others in which parties’ broad agreements contemplated fees for the prevailing party in “any action at law or in equity,” emphasizing that this agreement included attorneys’ fees from arbitration in the “award” to be entered as a judgment by the court, thereby limiting the court’s authority to award any additional attorneys’ fees.

The appellate court similarly rejected a bad-faith argument for additional attorneys’ fees, but remanded the case to the district court on the issue of prejudgment interest, finding the lower court’s short, handwritten opinion devoid of analysis relevant to the appropriateness of that interest. Crossville Med. Oncology, P.C. v. Glenwood Sys., LLC, No. 14-5444 (6th Cir. May 1, 2015).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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In the recent unpublished opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit confirmed that if an issue is voluntarily submitted to an arbitrator, then the arbitrator can decide the issue, even if it is one that should have been left to the court. After the arbitrator found for the defendant, Heritage Actions, on the basis that there was no meetings of the minds and therefore the contract was unenforceable and should be rescinded, the plaintiffs, OMG, L.P. and Greg Martin, attempted to have the award vacated in federal district court. The district court agreed with OMG and vacated the award on the basis that “a court was the proper decision-maker as to the contract formation issues in this case, not the arbitrator.” The Fifth Circuit reversed, pointing out that if the parties agree, they may arbitrate issues that are not part of the arbitration agreement. While OMG argued that the issue of the contract’s validity had not been submitted to the arbitrator either by the arbitration contract or by agreement, the Fifth Circuit found that both parties actively put forth arguments during the arbitration on whether there had been a meeting of the minds and whether the contracts should be rescinded. At no time during the arbitration did OMG argue that the arbitrator did not have the authority to decide this issue. The remedy OMG should have sought, said the Fifth Circuit, was to have “refused to arbitrate, leaving a court to decide whether the arbitrator could decide the contract formation issue,” i.e., whether there was a meeting of the minds. The district court’s judgment was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to confirm the arbitration award. OMG, L.P. v. Heritage Actions, Inc., No. 14-10403 (5th Cir. May 8, 2015).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

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A federal district court in New Hampshire has held that a service of suit clause contained in reinsurance contracts waives the reinsurers’ rights to remove a litigation brought against them in state court by the Insurance Commissioner of the State of New Hampshire, in his capacity as liquidator for the Home Insurance Company. The liquidator had filed the action in state court to collect reinsurance under the contracts. The reinsurers removed the case to federal court and the liquidator moved to remand, citing the reinsurance contracts’ service of suit clause which states that the reinsurer “will submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent jurisdiction within the United States” and will “abide by the final decision of any such Court.”

The liquidator argued the clause was a mandatory forum selection clause requiring litigation in the forum chosen by the insured, and thereby constituted a waiver by the reinsurers of their right to remove. The reinsurers contended that the clause was a permissive forum selection clause which constituted merely a consent to jurisdiction and did not mandate litigation in any particular forum. The court agreed with the liquidator and granted the motion to remand, finding the clause mandated exclusive jurisdiction in the New Hampshire state court. The court denied, however, the liquidator’s request for costs and expenses, finding the removal was “not objectively unreasonable.” Sevigny v. British Aviation Insurance Co., Case No. 15-cv-127 (USDC D.N.H. June 16, 2015).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

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