Reinsurance Focus

Louisiana and North Dakota amended their surplus lines statutes in line with the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 (the “NRRA”), which was included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DFA”), signed into law in July 2010. Under the North Dakota amendment (HB 1146), definitions of “reciprocal state” were removed from the statute, and portions of the statute applying to taxes on out-of-state surplus lines insurance were removed. Under the Louisiana amendment (HB 259), portions of its statute were removed that dealt with collecting premiums based on risks located in Louisiana but insured by out of state surplus lines insurers.  The Louisiana bill repeals the authority for the Louisiana Insurance Commissioner to enter into NIMA, the Nonadmitted Insurance Multi-state Agreement compact, as to which we have posted, reducing the efficacy of the compact in achieving the premium tax provisions of the DFA.

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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Gardner Denver, Inc. (“Gardner”), had entered into a settlement agreement with its liability insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (“NUF”) to resolve a dispute over Gardner’s coverage under various indemnity agreements. NUF honored the settlement agreement for several years, paying Gardner’s claims. However, once NUF entered into a “retroactive reinsurance” agreement with National Indemnity Company (“NICO”), in which NICO assumed NUF’s obligations and liabilities, NICO delegated the claims handling to another entity, which asserted a coverage defense and ceased paying Gardner’s claims under the settlement agreement. Gardner sued NICO and the claims administrator for tortious interference with a contract, and NICO countered with a motion to dismiss. NICO contended that the tortious interference claim failed because NICO had a qualified privilege as NUF’s agent (similar to the protection afforded to corporate officers under the “business judgment” rule) to handle claims on behalf of NUF. The trial court agreed with NICO and found that the complaint failed to overcome the privilege by sufficiently alleging that NICO acted without justification and with malice, and dismissed the case.

The appellate court, however, reversed the dismissal, holding that it was a factual question whether NICO’s actions were in fact unjustified or malicious, based on interpretation of the underlying insurance and settlement agreements and other evidence not before court, and thus it was not a decision for the court to resolve on a motion to dismiss. “Until the court answers whether NICO’s defense was frivolous, it could not determine whether NICO acted in good faith or, alternatively, acted without justification or malice, in its failure to pay claims pursuant to the settlement agreement.” Gardner Denver, Inc. v. National Indemnity Co., et al., Case No. 4-14-0713 (Ill. App. Ct. May 21, 2015).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

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An administrative law judge for the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) found in favor of Talina Torres (“Torres”) against Employers Resource (“Employers”) after determining that an arbitration clause within an employment contract was unenforceable. From September 2009 until June 2011, Torres was employed by Beth’s Kitchen, Inc., which was staffed by Employers. Torres filed a wage and hour putative class action lawsuit in California state court after being laid-off. Employers was named as a co-defendant. Employers then successfully moved to compel individual arbitration arguing that, under Stolt-Nielsen, class arbitration may not be inferred when a contract is silent on the issue. Following this ruling, Torres filed a complaint with the Board contending that Employers restricted her rights to engage in “protected concerted activities” as an employee under the National Labor Relations Act, citing recent Board decisions Murphy Oil and D.R. Horton.

In response to the Board complaint, Employers made various arguments, including that the Board lacked standing to hear the case as Torres was not an employee of Employers. Employers further contended that, contrary to the facts in Murphy Oil and D.R. Horton, the employment agreement in this case was not mandatory as a condition of employment with Beth’s Kitchen. The Board, however, found that while Torres did not interact with Employers, Employers did prepare the employment agreement for Beth’s Kitchen, Employers made itself a party to the agreement, and Employers then relied on the agreement in the litigation. Therefore, Employers was sufficiently implicated as violating Torres’s rights under the NLRA. The Board also noted that based on various representations made by Employers and Beth’s Kitchen, Torres was led to believe that the employment agreement was mandatory as a condition of employment. The Board ordered that Employers rescind or revise the mandatory arbitration provision and also that they not oppose Torres’ class action wage and hour suit on the basis of the employment agreement. Employers Resource and Talina Torres, Case 31-CA-097189 (N.L.R.B. May 18, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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We previously posted on a district court’s dismissal, with prejudice, of an Amended Complaint challenging the propriety of payments to the ceding insurer of the Mariah Re catastrophe bond which exhausted the cat bond’s trust account.  The Amended Complaint contended that the payment amount had not been calculated in accordance with the provisions of the cat bond’s documents, and that a lesser amount, which would not have exhausted the trust account, should have been paid instead.  The district court found that the documents clearly set forth the process for calculating the payment amount, and that the payment amount had been calculated in accordance with the contractual agreements.  It therefore dismissed the case with prejudice.  The Court of Appeal, after briefly describing the contractual relationships, simply stated that “[w]e AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for substantially the reasons stated by Judge Sullivan in his opinion of September 30, 2013.”  This result demonstrates the importance of clarity in the drafting of cat bond documents, and may help to reduce whatever uncertainty this lawsuit engendered in the cat bond market.  Mariah Re Limited v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, No. 14-4062 (2nd Cir. June 30, 2015).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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Plaintiff Excalibur Reinsurance Corporation (“Excalibur”) sought a preliminary injunction in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to enjoin Defendants Select Insurance Company and the Travelers Indemnity Company from proceeding with litigation on the same issues in the District of Connecticut. Excalibur argued that without the injunction, it would need to post security in the Connecticut action, an action that would deplete its corporate assets and seriously affect its liquidity. The district court, however, denied Excalibur’s preliminary injunction because it found that Excalibur would not be “irreparably harmed” if the request were denied. The court found that Excalibur would recover posted funds in Connecticut if it prevailed. It also noted that a sworn statement by its Assistant Vice President was insufficient evidence to demonstrate the potential injury the company faced from posting security in two different matters.

Excalibur Reinsurance Corp. v. Select Ins. Comp., No. 15-2522 (USDC E.D. PA. June 2, 2015)

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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In a Special Focus article, Renee Schimkat discusses recent law on the discoverability of reinsurance-related information in non-reinsurance matters:
“Is There Rhyme or Reason to the Scope of Permissible Reinsurance-Related Discovery?”

This post written by Renee Schimkat.
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The Middle District of Florida recently granted in part and denied in part plaintiff Stewart Title Guaranty Company’s (“Stewart Title”) motion to dismiss defendant First American Title Insurance Company’s (“First American”) counterclaim for breach of the utmost duty of good faith. As noted in a prior post, this case involves disputes regarding reinsurance agreements that First American entered into with Old Republic National Title Insurance Company (“Old Republic”) and Stewart Title. In these agreements, Old Republic and Stewart Title agreed to assume part of First American’s contractual liability under a title insurance policy.

When mechanic’s liens were discovered on the property at issue, First American negotiated a $41 million settlement of the claim before turning to Old Republic and Stewart Title to pay their proportionate share of that sum. While Old Republic paid under its reservation of rights, Stewart Title chose not to pay, and instead, sued First American for rescission, reformation, declaratory judgment, and negligence. First American countersued Stewart Title for breach of contract, breach of the utmost duty of good faith, and declaratory judgment.

Stewart Title moved to dismiss First American’s counterclaim for breach of the utmost duty of good faith on the same bases as a prior dismissal granted in favor of Old Republic. First American contended that Stewart Title’s breach of the reinsurance agreement differed from Old Republic’s alleged breach in that Stewart Title did not pay under its reservation of rights. First American’s counterclaim alleged that Stewart Title breached the utmost duty of good faith in the following four ways: (1) failing to pay the claim as required under the insurance contract; (2) engaging in delay tactics; (3) using First American’s documents against it in support of its allegations and preemptively filing suit against First American; and (4) accusing First American of making misrepresentations and omissions. While the district court held that the first two claims necessarily could be tied to breach of the reinsurance contract, the latter two claims could not and, consequently, the latter two were dismissed.

Old Republic Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. First American Title Ins. Co., No. 8:15-cv-126-T-30EAJ, 2015 WL 1530611 (USDC M.D. Fla. June 8, 2015)

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri which rejected the contention that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable, and unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, because (1) the prohibitively high costs associated with an individual arbitration proceeding prevented plaintiffs from pursuing their claims; and (2) it included a waiver of punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. In this case, a class of cleaning business franchisees sued a franchisor and related companies for RICO violations. Plaintiffs also contended that some defendants were non-signatories and therefore could not enforce the arbitration agreement. In response, defendants moved to compel individual arbitration citing the arbitration provision language in the respective franchise agreements.

Plaintiffs supported their claims with several figures including average loss per plaintiff, a range of individual filing fees, average daily fees for arbitrators in four cities, and a likely hearing length of three days. Altogether, plaintiffs asserted that their individual arbitration costs would exceed their respective damages. Ultimately, the court found that plaintiffs’ proof was insufficient because (1) the arbitrations would not take place in any of the four cities for which daily fees were provided and (2) plaintiffs did not submit individual affidavits demonstrating their inability to afford arbitration costs. The court emphasized that rather than a hypothetical inability to pay, plaintiffs must provide specific evidence of their individual inability to pay the actual arbitration fees likely to be incurred in order to overcome the federal policy favoring arbitration. The court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that even if enforceable, the arbitration agreement prohibited non-signatories from compelling arbitration. The court also held that the arbitration agreement language was broad enough to include various non-signatory third parties, and deemed them capable of enforcing the arbitration provision. Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., No. 14-1567 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2015).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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In this Special Focus, Richard Euliss discusses the recent increased interest by the IRS in auditing small captive insurers.

This post written by Richard Euliss.

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In a case involving a dispute over steel production to replace a portion of the Whitestone Bridge spanning New York City’s East River, a federal district court remanded an arbitration award back to the arbitrator. Under the parties’ arbitration agreement, the arbitrator was to issue a reasoned award. However, the arbitrator’s award was a two-page award with the “arbitrator merely list[ing] various categories of monetary damages without explanation as to how he calculated those figures or determined liability.” Under the Southern District of New York standard, a reasoned award is one where the arbitrator presents “something short of findings of fact and conclusions of law but more than a simple result. Where the award offered no more than the damages, the court found that this low standard was not met.

The court chose not to vacate the award, however. Noting that some courts have completely vacated the award where arbiters have ignored the arbitration agreement and exceeded their powers, the court found that the doctrine of functus officio (once the award is made, the duty is done) was inapplicable. Because the arbitrator never completed his duty, the court found that remand to do so was proper. Tully Const. Co. v. Canam Steel Corp., No. 1:13-cv-03037-PGG (USDC S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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