Reinsurance Focus

In an opinion illustrating the principles for the approval of commutations in liquidation proceedings, a Pennsylvania state court approved a commutation and settlement agreement by and between Reliance Insurance Company (“Reliance”) and General Security National Insurance Company, formerly known as Sorema North America Reinsurance Company (“GSN”). Under the terms of the agreement, GSN agreed to pay Reliance $13,000,000 in exchange for a release of all past, present, and future liabilities which have arisen or may arise under certain reinsurance contracts issued by GSN to certain enumerated Reliance subsidiaries (though generally excluding certain foreign subsidiaries). The court found that the agreement constituted a fair and reasonable settlement of GSN’s past and potential future obligations to Reliance under the reinsurance agreements recited. Ario v. Reliance Ins. Co., Docket No. 269 M.D. 2001 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 30, 2008).

This post written by John Pitblado.

The Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen – Self Insurers Fund (the “Fund”) is a self-insurance group formed by member companies as a means of securing workers compensation coverage for their employees. In 1998, the Fund obtained statutorily required excess coverage from Reliance Indemnity Company, and in 2001 Reliance became insolvent. The Fund filed proofs of claim against Reliance with the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (“LIGA”). LIGA denied the claims, asserting that the Fund was an insurer and the excess coverage was reinsurance, thus removing the claims from coverage by LIGA under the terms of governing state statutes. The fund brought suit to establish coverage for all past and future claims.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the Fund. The Louisiana Appellate Court affirmed, citing the terms of applicable workers compensation and insurance guaranty association statutes to support its determination that the excess coverage the Fund obtained was not “reinsurance” as that term is used under applicable statutes and that the Fund is not an “insurer” causing it to become statutorily exempt from coverage through LIGA. The Court also rejected LIGA’s argument that a statutory exclusion of coverage to any self-insured corporation with a net worth above $25,000,000 should apply to the Fund’s member companies in the aggregate. The court found that the member companies were not “affiliates” of one another as the term is used in the statute and thus held that their net worth should not be aggregated for purposes of the statutory exclusion. Louisiana Safety Assoc. of Timbermen – Self Insurers Fund v. Louisiana Ins. Guaranty Assoc., No. 43,615–CA (La. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2008).

This post written by John Pitblado.

CIFG Holding, Ltd., the holding company for CIFG's financial guaranty subsidiaries, has reached an agreement to commute approximately $12 billion in troubled credit swaps and reinsure $13 billion of municipal bonds. The transactions were announced in a press release by CIFG and a news release from the New York Insurance Department. According to New York Superintendent Eric Dinallo, the result will be that the bonds are novated to Assured Guaranty Corp., with the municipal bonds going from junk bond to highest investment grade rating, leaving CIFG as a solvent bond insurer in a position to pay claims on its remaining policies. The consideration for the transactions include cash payment and equity consideration. The result is a change in the controlling shareholders of CIFG, with changes in senior management expected.

This post written by Rollie Goss.

The “Ades” and “Berg” groups of investors (the “Ades Berg Group”), were parties who joined in the bankruptcy proceedings of the Bennett Funding Group, Inc. and related companies (the “Bennett Group”), based on claims that, among other things, the Bennett Group had defrauded them in an investment scheme. The Bennett Group was insured under a reinsurance contract issued by Sphere Drake Insurance PLC (“Sphere Drake”). A settlement was reached in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings between some groups of investors and Sphere Drake. As part of the settlement, Sphere Drake made some payments to certain parties, and held remaining policy proceeds for distribution to remaining parties in the bankruptcy.

Richard Breeden, as bankruptcy Trustee of the Bennett Group, asserted declaratory claims within the context of the bankruptcy proceeding against Sphere Drake and the Ades Berg Group pertaining to the distribution of unallocated policy proceeds. The Ades Berg Group asserted a counterclaim against Mr. Breeden, seeking the imposition of a constructive trust over any remaining insurance proceeds. Mr. Breeden sought dismissal of the counterclaim, arguing that the imposition of a constructive trust would inequitably interfere with his duties as Trustee to distribute proceeds to remaining debtors in accordance with applicable federal bankruptcy law. The bankruptcy court agreed, dismissing the counterclaim, with prejudice, based in part on principles embodied in the federal bankruptcy laws. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the New York state law equitable principles urged by The Ades Berg Group did not conflict with the purposes of the federal bankruptcy laws, and that the bankruptcy court’s ruling thus did not run afoul of recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent cited by the Ades Berg Group, which reaffirmed the principle that constructive trusts should be determined with reference to state law. In re Ades and Berg Group Investors, No. 07-3464 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2008).

This post written by John Pitblado.

As we previously posted in July, 2007, a UK court assessed costs against insurance broker Horace Holman & Co. (“Horace”) in an action Horace brought against Equitas Ltd. (“Equitas”) which the Court found to be “largely fruitless.” The matter was recently brought back before the Court by Equitas, which sought post-judgment enforcement of the order, insofar as Horace has not made ordered payments. Horace responded that it was in liquidation proceedings, and Equitas responded by asserting that Horace’s liability is recoverable from Mr. Arwyn Powell, who was added as a party to the proceeding. Mr. Powell was Holman’s sole shareholder and managing director, and also shareholder and director of related companies, including Camomile Management Consulting Ltd. (“Camomile”), which was a creditor of Horace in the liquidation proceedings.

The Court rejected the enforcement orders sought by Equitas. First, the Court rejected the allegation that Horace’s liquidation was a previously devised plan to avoid any judgment in the event one was obtained against it, and that Equitas thus had no further rights against Horace than as creditor in the liquidation proceedings. The court rejected claims directly against Mr. Powell as sole shareholder of Horace, finding no ground for “piercing the corporate veil.” The Court also rejected the claim that Powell, as Camomile’s shareholder, stood to benefit from liquidation, and Camomile’s position as creditor in that proceeding. Finally, the Court found it dispositive that Equitas failed to warn Powell that it would seek to recover directly against him, prior to making its application for such recovery. Equitas Ltd. v. Horace Holman & Co., Ltd. [2008] EWHC 2287 (Comm) (Oct. 3, 2008).

This post written by John Pitblado.

In a July 12, 2007 post, we reported on issues relating to HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited (“HIH”). The question before the court was whether it had jurisdiction to entertain a request under the Insolvency Act for directions to the liquidators in England to transfer assets collected by them to the liquidators in an Australian liquidation. The Court of Appeal held that it would not direct a transfer of the English assets by the English provisional liquidators to the Australian liquidators because to do so would prejudice the interests of many of the creditors. The House of Lords disagreed, allowing an appeal and ruling that the English assets of the insolvent insurer should be remitted to the Australian liquidator. There were sharp differences of opinion as to why exactly that should be the case.

The HIH group presented winding up petitions to the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 2001. Some of the assets, which consisted mostly of reinsurance claims on London policies, were situated in England, so English provisional liquidators were appointed. The Australian judge subsequently issued winding up orders and sent a letter to the High Court in London asking that the provisional liquidators remit the assets to the Australian liquidators for distribution in accordance with Australian law. The question on appeal was whether the English court could and should accede to the request. The alternative was a separate liquidation and distribution of the English assets under the English Insolvency Act of 1986. The manner of distribution mattered because Australian law generally gave priority to insurance creditors at the expense of other creditors, while the same result would not obtain under English law.

The decision was resolved primarily by analyzing the tension between section 426(4) of the Insolvency Act, which allows an English court with insolvency jurisdiction to assist designated foreign courts (including Australian courts), and section 426(5) of the same Act, which allows a court discretion to provide assistance in accordance with the rules of private international law, including the common law principle of “modified universalism.” That principle requires United Kingdom courts to cooperate with Australian courts to ensure that all the assets are distributed under a single system of distribution. While the court stated that a refusal to remit the assets might be appropriate if it causes a manifest injustice to a creditor, it ultimately found that the Australian distribution was not unacceptably discriminatory or contrary to public policy.

The dispute was focused on whether the basis of jurisdiction ought to be grounded in the common law considerations allowed by section 426(5) or the discrete statutory authority of section 426(4). Lord Hoffmann would have allowed the remission solely through the exercise of common law principles. He argued that under the common law doctrine of ancillary winding up, English courts may “disapply” parts of the statutory scheme by authorizing the English liquidator to allow actions he is obliged by statute to perform in accordance with English law to be performed by the foreign liquidator in accordance with foreign law. Others, including Lord Phillips, rejected this view: “I do not propose to stray from the firm area of common ground [of allowing the appeal under section 426] onto the controversial area of whether, in the absence of statutory jurisdiction, the same result could have been reached under a discretion available under the common law.” Lord Neuberger, too, opposed Lord Hoffman’s view, stating that he took “the view that it would not have been open to an English court to make the order sought by the Australian liquidators in the absence of section 426(4) and (5) of the 1986 Act.” McGrath v. Riddell [2008] 1 WLR 852, [2008] UKHL 21 (Apr. 9, 2008).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

On December 20, 2007, we reported that claims arising out of allegedly purposeful undercapitalization of a captive reinsurer survived a motion to dismiss. Since that time, the plaintiff (rehabilitator for Frontier Insurance Co.) moved for entry of a declaratory judgment and an award of compensatory damages plus prejudgment interest by default.

The Southern District of California concluded that plaintiff met the standards for entry of a default judgment, adequately alleged both an enforceable contract and a breach of contract by ASIL (the captive reinsurer), and that the default was not due to excusable neglect. ASIL indicated to Frontier that it would “allow judgment to be entered by default and pay all the available funds to Frontier.” The court granted the motion for entry of default and entered a judgment finding ASIL liable to plaintiff for $577,966.33 in compensatory damages and $91,511.33 in prejudgment interest (calculated at 10% per annum). Mills v. Ramona Tire, Inc., Case No. 07-0052 (USDC S.D. Cal., Sept. 23, 2008).

This post written by John Black.

We previously posted on March 17, 2008 about a bankruptcy judgment in favor of a reinsured, Acceptance Insurance Companies, Inc. (“Acceptance”), which sought to be excused from the payment of $9 million in premium owed to its reinsurer for the remaining term of a five year contract because it had ceased writing the underlying crop insurance which was the subject of the reinsurance contract. As we posted, a bankruptcy appellate panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment, finding that Acceptance’s failure to continue writing the underlying risk did not excuse it from its premium obligation to the reinsurer.

Separately, Acceptance had also filed suit in the Federal Court of Claims, seeking money damages against the United States on the theory that it was forced to stop writing its crop insurance business, which had become worthless due to the unwarranted regulatory action of the U.S. Department of Agriculture Risk Management Agency (“RMA”). In particular, Acceptance alleged that an RMA Administrator improperly rejected a deal requiring his regulatory approval, by which Acceptance had proposed to sell its crop insurance business to an interested third party. Acceptance alleged that the subsequent failure of the deal caused the loss of all value of its crop insurance business, which loss constituted an unwarranted governmental taking of its property under the Fifth Amendment. The United States moved to dismiss Acceptance’s claim for failure to state a legally cognizable cause of action. The court granted the government’s motion, distinguishing the taking of “property” from government action which merely has the effect of interfering with or frustrating the performance of a contract. The court found that, despite regulatory action which allegedly rendered the property worthless, Acceptance nevertheless retained possession of the business, and thus lost no “property” as that term is construed under applicable Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Acceptance Insurance Companies, Inc. v. United States, No. 03-2794 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 25, 2008).

This post written by John Pitblado.

In 1979, Bennett signed a contract with Lloyd’s as a Name to provide underwriting capital for insurance syndicates. The contract contained clauses stating that English law applied to Names’ disputes and such disputes can only be resolved in the courts of England. At the time the contract was signed, Lloyd’s failed to disclose massive anticipated losses. In 1998, Bennett and 600 other Names sought to avoid the forum selection and choice of law clauses. The Ninth Circuit upheld the clauses. Lloyd’s sued in England and won a large judgment against non-settling Names to recover mandatory premiums. Lloyd’s then sought to enforce its claim against Bennett, a non-settling Name, in Utah District Court. The court found in favor of Lloyd’s. Bennett appealed, and this appeal was consolidated with other Names cases in the Reinhart case before the Tenth Circuit. The circuit court upheld the forum selection and choice of law clauses.

During the pendency of the Reinhart appeal, Bennett filed for bankruptcy and brought two separate lawsuits under the auspices of the bankruptcy case. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of the first suit, and the second suit went to trial. In the second suit, the court granted Lloyd’s summary judgment motion and a motion for sanctions, finding that the forum selection issue had been previously determined. Bennett appealed, but the district court affirmed the ruling.

Bennett appealed the bankruptcy court’s sanctions order, again advancing arguments against the forum selection clause. The court upheld the award of sanctions, finding the appeal from the bankruptcy court to be frivolous, and that “no reasonable attorney” could believe otherwise based upon the doctrine of res judicata and the Tenth Circuit’s prior opinions. Bennett v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s (In re Bennett), Case No. 2:07-CV-736 TS (USDC Utah Sept. 24, 2008).

This post written by Dan Crisp.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has reversed a trial court’s ruling denying a reinsurer’s (CIC) asserted setoff of reinsurance claims in the liquidation of the Home Insurance Company (Home). CIC reinsured Home, remitting money to Home under a claims protocol that provided for a right of setoff controlled by a New Hampshire statute. Separately, CIC also reinsured certain affiliated insurance companies that had ceded a participation in their liabilities under certain policies in exchange for, among other things, an assignment of all rights to reinsurance recoverables relating to those policies. However, this assignment was qualified by a “put-back” provision that required CIC to return to its affiliated cedents any reinsurance recoverables deemed by CIC to be uncollectible, together with the rights to any related collateral. Among the reinsurance claims assigned to CIC were reinsurance obligations of Home to the affiliated cedents, i.e., reinsurance recoverables. Accordingly, pursuant to the claims protocol between CIC and Home, CIC sought to setoff amounts payable by it to Home against these recoverables.

Home’s liquidator objected to the attempted setoff, arguing that the New Hampshire statute referenced in the claims protocol required that setoff debts be “mutual,” and that the put-back provision destroyed mutuality by rendering the assignment conditional, not absolute. The liquidator contended that the provision made the affiliated cedents, not CIC, ultimately liable for the reinsurance. A referee ruled in favor of the liquidator, and the trial court sustained that ruling, reasoning that the mutuality requirement was not satisfied because the terms of the assignment required the return of uncollectible reinsurance, and so the assignment was conditional. On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, concluding the assignment was, in fact, absolute, the put-back provision notwithstanding. The Supreme Court found that, although the provision allocated risk to the affiliated cedents, this “retained interest” was not fatal. Importantly, CIC, not the affiliated cedents, controlled implementation of the provision; thus, “the provision did not constitute a prohibited means of control over the reinsurance recoverables or ‘any form of revocation’ in the hands of the affiliated cedents.” In the Matter of the Liquidation of the Home Insurance Company, Case No. 2007-794 (July 25, 2008).

This post written by Brian Perryman.