Reinsurance Focus

In 2002, the Kansas City Southern Railroad (“KCSR”) paid $37.5 million dollars to settle claims arising out of a fatal automobile accident. This case sub judice involved a dispute between KCSR’s captive insurer, TransFin Insurance Limited (“TransFin”), and TransFin’s reinsurers, Columbia Casualty and American Re-Insurance Company (together “the Reinsurers”), relating to coverage for this claim.

The Reinsurers claimed that they were not liable to indemnify TransFin on this claim because the underlying insured, KCSR, failed to meet the necessary conditions precedent required under their policy. The court disagreed, concluding that while KCSR failed to submit a claim in writing within the required policy period, they could take advantage of the relation-back procedure for claims made after the expiration of policies.

Having concluded that TransFin properly provided coverage on KCSR’s claim, the court addressed whether TransFin’s notice to its Reinsurers was late or otherwise inadequate and, if late, whether the Reinsurers must prove prejudice before they can successfully invoke the defense of late notice by the reinsured. The court stated that it did not need to decide whether notice was timely because even assuming it was, without demonstrating they suffered prejudice as a matter of law, the Reinsurers could not avoid coverage for late notice. Columbia Casualty v. TransFin Ins. Ltd., Case No. 2:05-CV-199 (USDC D. Vt. Apr. 27, 2007).

Two UK-based insurance companies, collectively known as Eagle Star, served as lead underwriter for a quota share reinsurance program reinsuring Legion Indemnity and Legion Insurance. A dispute arose over monies owed under the quota share reinsurance agreements. Legion Insurance was placed in rehabilitation in Pennsylvania, and an Illinois court placed Legion Indemnity under the control of the Illinois Commissioner of Insurance. Eagle Star filed an action against Legion in federal court. The Illinois court granted Eagle Star summary judgment, finding that the Pennsylvania court had determined the issue in Eagle Star's favor as to Legion Insurance, and that Legion Indemnity was bound by the decision based upon its privity with Legion Insurance and the doctrine of res judicata. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In re Liquidation of Legion Indemnity Company, Case No. 02-6695 (Ill. Ct.App. Mar. 29, 2007).

Employers Reinsurance Corporation (“ERC”) filed suit in Missouri federal court against its reinsured, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (“MassMutual”) alleging that MassMutual breached the parties’ reinsurance agreement. MassMutual filed various counterclaims alleging that ERC breached the contract by failing to reimburse it for covered claims under the contract. ERC sought dismissal of MassMutual’s counterclaims for vexatious refusal under Missouri and Kansas law and breach of fiduciary duty.

In dismissing both vexatious refusal claims, the court did not reach the substantive issue of whether the Missouri and Kansas statutes apply to a reinsurance contract, but rather dismissed on the ground that Connecticut law, and not Missouri or Kansas law, applied to the parties’ reinsurance contract. Applying Connecticut law, the court also dismissed MassMutual’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty, concluding that the “defendant has failed to plead sufficient facts in its counterclaim supporting a fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and defendant.” Specifically, the defendants failed “to allege facts that there was a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties or that plaintiff had superior knowledge, skill, or expertise.” The court added that “[c]considering that Connecticut courts have deemed that there is no fiduciary relationship between an individual policy holder and a sophisticated insurance company, they are not likely to imply one in a reinsurance relationship between two sophisticated insurance companies.” Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., Case No. 06-0188-CV-W-FJG (W.D.Mo. April 10, 2007).

A New Jersey federal judge ruled that an asset purchase agreement and a quota share reinsurance agreement did not obligate Hartford Fire Insurance Company (“Hartford”) and Twin City Insurance Company (“Twin City”) to step into the shoes of an insolvent insurer and provide coverage to Plaintiff for losses sustained in defending three fraudulent conveyance actions. The underlying fraudulent conveyance actions alleged that an ex-CEO played a shell game with the assets of GAF (the predecessor in interest to G-I) to shield itself from liability in pending asbestos litigation. The present action was originally filed against Reliance, but after Reliance filed for bankruptcy, Plaintiffs joined Hartford and Twin City, alleging that Defendants purchased the assets and renewal rights to Reliance’s D&O book of business and seeking coverage pursuant to that policy.

Ruling on competing summary judgment motions, the District Court said that Hartford and Twin City had no coverage obligation reasoning, among other things, that the “underlying fraudulent conveyance actions constitute a single claim that was first made under the Reliance Policy and before the inception of the Hartford/Twin City Policy” and that the Hartford/Twin City Policy and the Reliance Policy were two separate and distinct policies. G-I Holdings v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Case No. 00-6189 (D.N.J., Mar. 16, 2007).

This case arose from an insured’s allegation that its insurer both failed to defend it from claims of breach and to indemnify it for a settlement within the policy’s aggregate limit. The insured also sued the insurer’s claims administrator, presenting the novel issue of whether an independent claims administrator can be liable to an insured for bad faith claims handling, tortious interference with contractual relations, or negligence.

Applying Rhode Island law, the District Court of Rhode Island concluded that the insured could maintain a common law claim for bad faith, but could not maintain a statutory cause of action for bad faith because the statutory language limited claims to “the insurer issuing the policy.” (Emphasis added). The court also permitted the insured to proceed with a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations. The court, however, concluded that the insured could not maintain a negligence claim because “…binding [the administrator] to a duty of reasonable care viz-a-viz the insured would be illogical…without, at a bare minimum, holding…the actual insurer to the same.” In so holding, Rhode Island joined the majority of jurisdictions that have refused to recognize a general duty of due care from an independent insurance adjuster or insurance adjusting company to the insured. Robertson Stephens, Inc. and Bank of America Corp. v. Chubb Corp., Case No. 05-00360 (D.R.I. Feb. 14, 2007) .

In a matter that is difficult to describe briefly, an arbitrator has entered an award in an interesting reinsurance claims issue, and the award has been confirmed. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corporation (“Gerling”) issued a certificate of facultative reinsurance to Employers’ Surplus Lines Insurance (“Employers”) reinsuring an Excess Umbrella policy providing for $5,000,000 per occurrence and aggregate losses. When Gerling refused to pay its pro rata share of certain indemnity and defense costs, Employers demanded arbitration to enforce the certificate. Gerling argued that a non-concurrency existed between the facultative certificate and the umbrella policy with regard to the aggregate liability and liability for defense costs. Gerling argued that the absence of the word “aggregate” in various sections of the certificate precluded consideration of aggregate limits of liability and that its reinsurance limits applied strictly on a per-occurrence basis. Gerling also argued that it was not required to reimburse Employers for the defense costs associated with the settlement because the “follow the settlements” clause in the certificate was subject to the condition that an indemnity payment must be made on a specific claim before any defense costs attached. Gerling argued that this language was non-concurrent with Employers’ ultimate net loss liability theory. While the arbitrator acknowledged that the presumption of concurrency is “not absolute and can be overridden by clear language of limitation in the certificate,” this was not such a case. The arbitrator concluded that the absence of the word “aggregate” was insufficient to preclude liability, stating that “silence, as an expression of limitation, strains credulity and is insufficient to preclude aggregate liability.” The arbitrator also noted Gerling’s failure to use any of the methods available to it to limit aggregate liability, such as including the phrase “Nil Aggregate” in the certificate or by adding an endorsement. With respect to liability for defense costs, the arbitrator concluded that Gerling misinterpreted the “follow the settlements” clause and that the concept of “ultimate net loss” contained in the Employers’ policy was entitled to the presumption of concurrence. As such, Gerling was responsible for its share of the defense costs. Employers’ Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Global Reinsurance Corp., Case No. 07-30 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2007).

The UK Queen's Bench Division of the Commercial Court has denied applications to vacate prior judgments in an action brought by a reinsured against several defendants which served as reinsurance intermediaries under two binders involving short tail property and contingency risks and personal accident risks. Prior liability judgments had found that the intermediary group had fraudulently abused the binders by placing risks through the binders which were not authorized, and by signing an addenda to the binders, without authority, that provided the intermediaries an extra 40% commission on the first 12 months gross premium. Prior judgments had rescinded the binders and awarded damages for fraud and conspiracy totaling approximately £17,000,000. The opinion holds that liability judgments against several of the defendants were proper. R & V Versicherung AG v. Risk Insurance and Reinsurance Solutions SA, [2007] EWHC 79 (Comm. Jan. 29, 2007).

In English and American Insurance Company Ltd. v. Axa Re SA, [2006] EWHC 3323 (Comm. Ct. Dec. 20, 2006), the UK Commercial Court of the Queen's Bench Division granted summary judgment to English and American Insurance Company (“EAIC”) on ten reinsurance contracts, pursuant to which a predecessor of Axa Re reinsured EAIC for its participation in insurance of Dow Chemical Company. The losses related to claims relating to Dow's manufacture and sale of breat implant devices and silicone materials. Provisional liquidators had been apponted for EAIC in 1993, and EAIC has been the subject of a scheme of arrangement since 1995. After pursuing its solvent insurers, Dow pursued EAIC, which in turn made claims on its reinsurance. EAIC entered into what the Court described as an interim settlement with Dow, in which in effect recognized that it had a liability to Dow of at least $3,772,760. The scheme of arrangement was paying EAIC's creidtors a dividend rate of 25%. The Court granted EAIC partial summary judgment against Axa Re in the amount of $673,808, an amount which the Court found Axa Re had “no realistic prospect of successfully defending.” Apparently, the litigation will continue with respect to other amounts claimed by EAIC.

A District Court has enforced a Connecticut statute requiring that prior to filing any pleading in any court action, non-admitted insurers post collateral in an amount “sufficient to secure the payment of any final judgment.” Conn. Gen. Stat. section 38a-27. The Court held that this statute applied to reinsurers, but instead of striking an answer that had been filed, gave the defendant 15 days to post the required security, failing which its Answer would be stricken. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Universal Reinsurance Co., Case No. 06-158 (D. Ct. Jan. 25, 2007).

Swiss Re provided a type of reinsurance to Reliance Insurance Company for insurance of residual value insurance policies covering certain automobile risks. When Reliance became financially impaired, Swiss Re litigated liability and damage issues directly with the insured, Keybank USA. In a complicated 67 page opinion on cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted in part and denied in part the motions of both parties. This opinion considers multiple issues of contract interpretation, mitigation of damages and expert testimony. The Court recently entered an Order denying the motion of Keybank for reconsideration of the portion of the prior Order that granted partial summary judgment to Swiss Re with respect to auto leases that were part of Keybank's lease extension program. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Keybank U.S.A., Case no. 01-62 (USDC N.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2006).