Reinsurance Focus

A federal judge in New York has denied reinsurers’ motions for relief from a prior judgment. The reinsurers, Equitas Insurance Limited and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, argued that they were entitled to judicial relief because the insured, Arrowood Indemnity Company, procured an arbitration award later confirmed by the Southern District through fraud. Arrowood entered into a casualty reinsurance agreement with the underwriters. To recover under this agreement, claims needed to fall within one of three types of coverage. The underwriters denied a series of Arrowood’s asbestos claims under the “Common Cause Coverage” because it believed that the asbestos claims needed to be noticed during the original contract period. The parties submitted the matter to arbitration, where the panel agreed that Arrowood’s interpretation of the contract: that Common Cause Coverage was intended only to prevent recovery on known losses whose “common cause” occurred before the term of the original contract. The court confirmed the award.

Months later, the underwriters obtained a letter produced by Arrowood in a separate action that revealed Arrowood interpreted the Common Cause Coverage clause in the same way the underwriters had posited in the previous arbitration. The underwriters filed a motion seeking to relieve it from the judgment because of fraud. While relief on this basis under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not time-limited, similar relief under the Federal Arbitration Act imposes a time limit – a motion to vacate an arbitration award must be served upon the adverse party within three months after the award is filed or delivered. Because the Act trumps civil rules when those rules conflict, the underwriters were time-barred. Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. Equitas Insurance Ltd., Case No. 13 Civ. 7680 (USDC S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2015).

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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The United States Supreme Court has granted DIRECTV’s petition for Writ of Certiorari and will hear the following question presented: Whether the California Court of Appeal erred by holding, in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit, that a reference to state law in an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act requires the application of state law preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.

As reported here previously, DIRECTV had moved to dismiss or stay a class action litigation filed against it and to compel individual arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause contained in DIRECTV’s customer agreements in California, which specifically prohibit class actions. The trial court denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The Court of Appeal focused on the arbitration clause’s non-severability provision and its reference to “state” law to hold that the class-action waiver in the arbitration clause was invalid under California law and the entire arbitration agreement was therefore unenforceable. In its petition, DIRECTV argued that the Court of Appeal did precisely what the Supreme Court’s Concepcion decision prohibits: “It applies state law to invalidate an arbitration agreement solely because that agreement includes a class-action waiver.” DIRECTV further argued that because the decision is in direct conflict with a recent Ninth Circuit decision, creates an acknowledged conflict between state and federal courts on a matter of federal law, and “evinces the very hostility to arbitration that led to the enactment of the FAA in the first place,” the Supreme Court’s review was warranted. Petitioner’s brief on the merits is to be filed with the Court by May 29, 2015, and Respondents’ brief is to be filed by July 17, 2015. The Court is scheduled to hear the case during its October 2015 term. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, et al., Case No. 14-462.

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

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In late April, the Indiana Supreme Court held that Continental Casualty Company (“CNA”) must provide insurable relief for Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. (“Anthem”), reversing a lower court decision. Anthem’s expenditures were covered under their excess reinsurance policy.

Anthem, which later merged with co-defendant WellPoint Inc., was originally subject to multiple lawsuits in Florida and Connecticut for failing to pay claims in a timely manner, breach of state and federal statutes, breach of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Anthem later settled, without admitting wrongdoing or liability, a multi-district litigation that consolidated the various state actions. Anthem then sought indemnification from their reinsurers.

Anthem self-insured E&O liability coverage and also purchased additional reinsurance coverage. CNA and other implicated excess reinsurers denied coverage for Anthem’s underlying litigation expenses. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CNA. Twin City Fire Insurance Company (“Twin City”) later joined that verdict. A court of appeals affirmed that decision.

CNA argued that (1) Anthem’s alleged conduct was not solely in performance of “Professional Services,” a requirement under their reinsurance agreement; (2) that Anthem’s coverage relief was barred under Indiana public policy; and (3) Anthem’s alleged conduct was barred under the reinsurance agreements “dishonest or fraudulent act or omission” exception. The court found that Anthem’s coverage extended to “loss of the insured resulting from any claim or claims…for any Wrongful Act of the Insured…but only if such Wrongful Act…occurs solely in the rendering of or failure to render Professional services.” The court found that Anthem’s alleged conduct fit under this guidance, as the conduct was a part of Anthems handling of health claims. The court also noted a strong presumption for the enforceability of contracts, especially between CNA and Anthem, both sophisticated parties. For these and other reasons, the court reversed the trial court and granted in large part, summary judgment for Anthem.

WellPoint, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, No. 49S05-1404-PL-244 (Ind. Apr. 22, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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In a putative class action for denial of employment benefits brought by security contractors against their hiring firm, Blackwater Security Consulting, the court found that the governing agreements delegated the issue of arbitrability to an arbitrator and compelled arbitration. The contractors contended that the agreements contained no such delegation, but the court disagreed, finding that that the agreements’ incorporation of the AAA rules was sufficient to “clearly and unmistakably” submit arbitrability to an arbitrator. The court also found that the contractors’ challenge to the validity of the AAA clause based on fraud and duress failed “because it does not specifically address the delegation agreement itself as required by” the Supreme Court’s 2010 Rent-A-Center decision. The court further found that the contractors’ challenge based on mistake and unconsionability, “fails on the merits as a matter of law.” The contractors contended that they mistakenly believed that the agreements they signed did not contain arbitration provisions. This type of mistake, however, “about the nature of the contract and its contents—is not a mistake about an ‘existing or past fact’ that could satisfy” the law. As to unconscionability, the contractors argued that the shifting of attorneys’ fees and expenses from the firm to them was unfair, but the court rejected this argument as defective under Concepcion and other precedent. Mercadante v. XE Services, LLC, Case No. 1:11-cv-01044 (USDC D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2015).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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In late April, a district court in New York granted plaintiff Utica Mutual Insurance Company’s (“Utica”) motion to remand, implicating the voluntary-involuntary removal rule. Utica originally filed a breach of contract lawsuit against defendant American Re-Insurance Company (“American”). The lawsuit also named as co-defendant, Transatlantic Reinsurance Company (“Transatlantic”), a corporation domiciled and with a principal place of business in New York. American was initially unable to remove the case to federal court due to lack of diversity among the co-defendants.

A New York state court severed the claims against American and Transatlantic, thereby eliminating the diversity impediment for removal. Utica argued that “removability can only be created by Utica’s voluntary conduct,” and not by the court’s involuntary severance order. American argued that the voluntary-involuntary rule’s fraudulent misjoinder exception applied, as Transatlantic was improperly joined. The court found—citing second circuit precedent—that an action was not removable when non-diverse parties were made diverse by a court’s involuntary severance order. The voluntary-involuntary rule was designed to “protect against the possibility that a party might secure a reversal on appeal in state court of the non-diverse party’s dismissal, producing renewed lack of complete diversity in the state court action….in order to be removable, be one which could have been brought in federal court in the first instance.” The case turned on whether the order was final, and not simply voluntary.

As Utica’s severance order appeal was not yet final, a requirement under the voluntary-involuntary rule, the district court remanded the case back to the New York State Supreme Court. The court noted that American’s fraudulent misjoinder claim was “time barred” as defendants failed to file within thirty days after receipt. The court also noted that American understood “Utica’s motivation for joining Transatlantic and [American] as defendants in the same action,” an admission that went against their claim for fraudulent misjoinder.

Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Re-Ins. Co., No. 6:14-CV-1558 (USDC N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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The District Court for the Middle District of Florida recently held that defendant First American Title Insurance Company (“First American”) could maintain its breach of the utmost duty of good faith counterclaim against plaintiff Old Republic National Title Insurance Company (“Old Republic”), but that it could not countersue Old Republic for breach of contract. First American alleged that Old Republic breached the Reinsurance Agreement (“Agreement”) the parties shared by 1) paying First American under a reservation of rights to assert claims against First American, 2) disputing Old Republic’s obligation to pay First American, and 3) improperly trying to claw back the $3.8 million payment. The court held that First American’s claims were insufficient because the Agreement did not explicitly prohibit Old Republic’s actions, a necessary basis for a breach of contract claim. The court did, however, find sufficient First American’s claim that Old Republic breached the utmost duty of good faith. As the court noted, “generously construing First American’s allegations under this count in conjunction with its claim that Old Republic breached the Reinsurance Agreement by failing to pay its share of defense costs,” the pleaded facts for First American’s “utmost good faith” claim were sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss stage.

Old Republic Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. First American Title Ins. Co., No. 8:15-cv-126-T-30EAJ, 2015 WL 1530611 (USDC M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2015)

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denied defendant OneBeacon Insurance Company’s (“OneBeacon”) motion for summary judgment against plaintiffs Century Indemnity Company (“Century”) and Pacific Employers Insurance Company (“Pacific”). Century and Pacific, which held reinsurance policies issued by OneBeacon, sued the reinsurer to recover expenses in addition to the stated policy limits and to recover an award of interest on the payments received. OneBeacon  sought summary judgment on two grounds: 1) that the limit stated in the parties’ reinsurance certificates placed a total cap on its liability, and 2) that plaintiffs were not entitled to an award of interest on payments. The court denied OneBeacon’s motion.  First, the court determined that certain conditions placed on premiums in the reinsurance certificates meant that the premium was subject to a condition that excluded expenses in calculating the total loss limit. “If anything,” the court noted, “the terms of the certificates may have created a presumption of expense-exclusiveness.”

Second, the court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds. OneBeacon cited two prior district court cases that considered the “limit-of-liability” issue, but the court held that this legal authority did not “hold the necessary weight of final judgments at this juncture in order to apply collateral estoppel against plaintiffs.”  Finally, because the court had already granted plaintiffs’ separate motion for summary judgment on payments of interest, it denied OneBeacon’s motion on that issue as well.  Century Indem. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., No. 02928 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar. 27, 2015).

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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A federal district court in Colorado has denied motions for a protective order filed by the insurers in a coverage litigation where Cantex, a third-party assignee to claims against the insurers, asserts causes of action for breach of contract and bad faith. The discovery dispute concerned the scope of Cantex’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition designations which sought discovery into areas of reserve and reinsurance, claims handling, underwriting, and insurance contract interpretation. The court found that the 30(b)(6) deposition topics on reserve and reinsurance information were relevant when claims of bad faith were still pending. The court therefore denied the motion for a protective order as to those areas of discovery, but permitted the insurers to interpose objections based on privilege as they deem fit. The court further found that discovery seeking testimony relating to the (1) drafting, marketing, and underwriting of the policy, (2) handling of the claims made to the insurers, including the evaluation of the underlying litigation, and (3) interpretation of the insurance policies, was also relevant. The court denied the insurers’ motions for a protective order in their entirety. Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Cantex, Inc., No. 13-cv-00507 (USDC D. Colo. Apr. 14, 2015).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

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On a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment entered against it, on which we previously reported, Century Indemnity Company urged a New York federal court to review its order in light of a subsequent decision by a different judge. The ruling Century sought to reverse concluded that the reinsurance limits set forth in each certificate of insurance issued by its reinsurer, Global Reinsurance Corporation of America, were inclusive of costs and expenses and created an overall cap of liability. The intervening decision Century brought to the Court’s attention was Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Munich Reinsurance American, Inc., an unpublished 2014 decision by the Second Circuit. Century’s motion was denied. The Utica decision was not controlling law and Century did not introduce new evidence. In addition, Utica would not require a different conclusion given that it was based on the particular language in the certificates in that case, which differed from the language of the certificates issued by Global. Specifically, the language in the certificates in the Utica case made losses and damages subject to the certificates’ limit of liability, but did not include a similar provision for “loss expenses.” Global’s certificates provided a total cap for liability and did not differentiate between reinsurance accepted for loss versus reinsurance accepted for expenses. Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Century Indemnity Co., No. 13 Civ. 06577 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

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A federal district court has confirmed a $14 million arbitration award entered in favor of Amerisure against its reinsurer Everest. As we earlier reported, the court had previously denied the motion to seal briefing associated with Amerisure’s motion to confirm the award. Now at issue was the confirmation, modification, or vacatur of the award, which directed Everest to indemnify Amerisure for its share of asbestos losses that fell within the parties’ reinsurance treaties. Everest moved to vacate the award on several grounds, including an arbitrator’s “evident partiality” in the proceedings and the panel’s allegedly erroneous procedural and evidentiary rulings. At the core of the reinsurance dispute was whether Amerisure could aggregate individual asbestos losses into a single occurrence in order to exceed the applicable retention and thereby qualify for indemnification under the reinsurance treaties. The panel held that Amerisure could aggregate the losses by relying, in part, on what it found to be the “commonly accepted” business of treating multiple asbestos losses as a single occurrence. The panel rejected the argument that Amerisure’s claim was precluded or undercut by the fact that the underlying claims were settled as individual losses and further discounted the expert opinion testimony offered by Everest as unpersuasive. The district court, in turn, affirmed the award, rejecting all arguments of partiality or erroneous rulings. While Everest had established the panel exceeded its powers in one respect, it did not find that warranted vacatur or modification of the award. Amerisure Mutual Insurance Co. v. Everest Reinsurance Co., Case No. 14-cv-13060 (USDC E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2015).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

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