Reinsurance Focus

A district court refused to vacate an arbitration award where Preis, a terminated employee, failed to produce sufficient evidence of bias or misconduct in the arbitration panel’s decision. Preis moved to vacate the award in favor of former employee Citigroup Global Markets Inc. on the grounds that (1) the panel was biased, and (2) the panel manifestly disregarded the law. Although Preis relied on New York’s civil practice laws and Citigroup relied on the Federal Arbitration Act, the court decided choice of law was irrelevant because no conflict existed between state and federal law on the grounds for vacating arbitration awards.

On the issue of bias, the court found that the examples cited by Preis were neutral, did not suggest prejudice, and “would not lead a reasonable person to conclude that the panel was biased.” The court was even more skeptical of Preis’s manifest disregard claim, finding that he failed to show the panel intentionally defied a well-defined, applicable law. His claims did not rise to the level of showing “some egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrator,” and thus, did not warrant vacating the award. The court did, however, deny Citigroup’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs, finding it failed to show that Preis acted in bad faith in seeking to overturn the award. Preis v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Case No. 14-06327 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2015).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

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Collective defendants, Nationwide, appealed from a Massachusetts superior court judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of collective plaintiffs, Liberty Mutual. The underlying dispute involved a 1972 reinsurance treaty wherein Nationwide, the reinsurer, indemnified Liberty Mutual, the cedant, for a portion of the losses paid on Liberty Mutual’s general liability and worker’s compensation policies. At issue was a provision in the treaty granting Nationwide a right of access to Liberty Mutual’s documents concerning the covered policies. The dispute arose when Liberty Mutual refused to produce documents it claimed were protected by attorney-client and work product privileges. At arbitration, the panel dismissed Nationwide’s argument that it was entitled to any and all documents relating to the covered policies, reasoning that the right of access provision excluded privileged documents. Liberty Mutual thereafter submitted an application to the superior court to confirm the award and Nationwide submitted a cross-application to vacate the access to records portion of the judgment.

Despite a de novo review, the court’s discretion was limited as it was bound by the arbitrators’ findings and legal conclusions, even if they appeared erroneous, inconsistent, or unsupported by the record. Through this lens, the court of appeals upheld the arbitrators’ decision, dismissing Nationwide’s argument that the arbitrators exceeded their powers in interpreting the access to records provision in the reinsurance treaty. The appellate court reasoned that where the parties do not dispute the scope of the arbitrators’ powers and where the claimed error is in the interpretation of the terms of the parties’ underlying contract and not in the agreement to arbitrate in the first place, it must apply a severely limited review of arbitration awards. Liberty Mutual v. Nationwide, No. 14-1129 (Mass. App. Ct. June 5, 2015).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

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The purpose of the Act is to provide Delaware businesses with the ability to resolve disputes within 120 days in a “cost-effective, and efficient manner, through voluntary arbitration conducted by expert arbitrators.” The Act streamlines the process for seeking court assistance with appointing arbitrators, if necessary, which may occur only in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The Act gives the arbitrator exclusive jurisdiction to determine the scope of the arbitration and to determine the type of relief, “including any legal or equitable remedy appropriate in the sole judgment of the arbitrator.” Only one direct challenge to the Delaware Supreme Court is authorized, and only the standards of the FAA are utilized on appeal. Among other limiting measures, the Act may not be used in controversies between businesses and consumers, in controversies in which parties have not expressly consented in writing to arbitration, and in controversies in which choice of Delaware law has not been expressly selected. To ensure rapid resolution of arbitrations, the Act contains a schedule for the reduction of the arbitrator’s fees depending upon the lateness of the award: (1) between 0 to 30 days late, the reduction is 25%; (2) between 30 to 60 days late, the reduction is 75%; and (3) greater than 60 days late, the reduction is 100%. While the arbitrator is required to issue a written award, there is no requirement that it be a reasoned award. Thus, the award can be as simple as “plaintiff wins.” Delaware House Bill No. 49 (eff. May 4, 2015).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

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The Third Circuit affirmed an arbitration award under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) as the decision reached by the arbitrator comported with the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the parties. Washington Hospital (“WH”) employed Deborah Holden, an LPN, before terminating her employment pursuant to the CBA’s absenteeism policy. Holden’s union filed a grievance protesting Holden’s discharge. An arbitrator decided that the termination was improper and reinstated Holden, because WH failed to follow contractually agreed upon discipline procedures. The arbitrator made this decision despite noting that Holden’s ten absences in a 12-month time period would be sufficient grounds on which to terminate an employee. WH sought to vacate the award, but the district court upheld the award.

On appeal, WH argued that the court abused its discretion by denying WH’s request for discovery based on remarks by Holden that put her honesty at issue. However, the court found that Holden’s testimony was not fraudulent, and further, that Holden’s testimony was “immaterial” to the arbitration decision. Instead, the court upheld the district court’s decision because WH did not follow the CBA’s procedures, specifically—WH failed to give two warning notices before terminating Holden. Washington Hosp. v. SEIU Health Care Inc. Penn., Case No. 14-3951 (3d Cir. June 12, 2015).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding that LoRoad, LLC (“LoRoad”) failed to accept an agreement with Global Expedition Vehicles, L.L.C. (“Global”) that would allow LoRoad to enforce the arbitration contained within.

LoRoad negotiated with Global to build a custom expedition vehicle. The terms of the “Assembly Agreement” called for a nonrefundable $120,000 deposit. During the exchange of agreement drafts, LoRoad sent Global $120,000 along with a modified—allegedly signed—agreement shortly thereafter. As the relationship soured, Global stopped work on the expedition vehicle. LoRoad alleged that it did not have a final set of documents, as prior draft exchanges were simply contract negotiations. LoRoad sought to compel arbitration to handle the dispute per the agreement, asserting that the arbitration provision was enforceable because the parties exhibited the requisite intent to form a binding contract. In addition, LoRoad alleged that the arbitration provision was enforceable because that particular provision remained the same throughout multiple agreement draft iterations. The court focused on LoRoad’s intent. LoRoad’s only conduct to indicate an agreement was its payment of $120,000. However, it also argued that this sum was only a “good faith deposit” and not a payment per the agreement. Further, LoRoad sent emails to Global indicating that the agreement was “not yet executed.” Without an executed agreement or a free-standing agreement to arbitrate, arbitration could not be compelled. LoRoad, LLC v. Expedition Vehicles, LLC, Case No. 14-2636 (8th Cir. June 1, 2015)

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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We have previously reported on a case styled Munoz v. PHH Corp., one of similar suits alleging putative class actions under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act arising from purported “sham” reinsurance transfers covering private mortgage insurance. In this ruling, the court granted defendant’s partial motion to dismiss the plaintiff-intervenor’s amended complaint with prejudice and to strike certain allegations from the remaining pleading.

Previously, the court granted the plaintiff-intervenor leave to file an amended complaint to cure deficiencies identified in the court’s order for partial judgment on the pleadings against the plaintiff-intervenor for failure to plead sufficient facts. In that August 2014 order, the court found that PHH’s loan disclosure documents had adequately placed the tolling subclass on notice of their claims, and that no extraordinary circumstances justified the late filing. The court also found that the plaintiff-intervenor failed to sufficiently plead a claim of fraudulent concealment apart from the underlying RESPA claim.

The court found that the allegations in the amended complaint would involve the re-litigation of these previously resolved issues. It reasoned that the amended complaint’s equitable estoppel and tolling claims “merely cloak[ed] the same facts or irrelevant facts in new legal theory, one amenable to the same defenses that have already prevailed” and were therefore barred under the law of the case doctrine. The court dismissed with prejudice because its previous order granted the intervenor one opportunity to amend, and the intervenor failed to cure the complaint’s deficiencies. Because the court had dismissed the claims with prejudice, it struck certain pleadings filed after the date of the order permitting the filing of an amended complaint as immaterial. Munoz v. PHH Corp., Case No. 08-00759 (USDC E.D. Cal. May 21, 2015).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

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The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently remanded a case to the district court for full consideration of a request to compel arbitration, finding the lower court’s order “inconsistent with the emphatic federal policy in favor of” arbitration. The plaintiff, Dillon, sued several banks which were allegedly “complicit” in effectuating illegal payday loans by processing transfers on behalf of the lenders (tribal and out-of-state). The district court denied the banks’ initial motion to enforce arbitration clauses contained in the original loan agreements because the banks failed to provide authenticating evidence. When the banks renewed their motions to cure that deficiency by providing such evidence, the district court construed the motions as reconsideration motions, and denied them.

On appeal, the court analyzed the lower court’s perfunctory reasoning in construing the renewed motions as seeking reconsideration. The court rejected the idea that the banks only had one opportunity to invoke the Federal Arbitration Act’s enforcement mechanisms. Only when the party “is in default in proceeding with” arbitration does the Act foreclose the chance of obtaining a stay under its mechanisms. The court also distinguished the underlying issues presented by the initial and renewed motions to reject the notion that the law of the case doctrine justified denial. The district court’s ruling on the initial motions spoke to whether the pleadings established arbitrability did not, as law of the case, determine the renewed motions’ issue of whether Dillon consented to arbitration in the first place. The district court was instructed to, on remand, determine whether the claims are within the scope of the original loan agreement’s arbitration clause, and whether the banks forfeited those rights because they are “in default in proceeding” with arbitration. Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., No. 14-1728 (4th Cir. May 29, 2015).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

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A district court in Kansas denied as moot defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company’s motion to review a magistrate’s order granting plaintiff Great Plains Ventures, Inc.’s motion to compel reinsurance, reserves, and claims-related materials. The magistrate judge ruled in January that Liberty Mutual failed to establish why documents Great Plains had requested in a coverage dispute were irrelevant or privileged. Thus, the magistrate judge granted Great Plains’ motion to compel. Soon thereafter, Liberty Mutual requested that the magistrate judge stay his order in anticipation of its objection to the discovery order and its motion to review the order to compel. While the motion to review was pending, the magistrate judge denied the motion to stay and ordered Liberty Mutual to produce the documents. Liberty Mutual complied, and because it did so, the court ruled that its request for review was moot. Great Plains Ventures, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., No. 6:14-cv-01136 (USDC D. Kan. May 1, 2015).

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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The Commercial Court (a subdivision of the Queen’s Bench Division of the U.K.’s High Court of Justice), recently held that an underwriter could not avoid the reinsurance contracts it had underwritten because it failed to convince the court that it would not have underwritten those contracts. In a case involving nondisclosure of loss statistics, the court determined that plaintiff reinsurer, Axa, could not avoid two reinsurance agreements that it had entered into with defendant insured, Arab Insurance Group (ARIG). The court made this finding even though ARIG failed to disclose – and perhaps even misrepresented – the loss statistics associated with its existing book of internal risk that was subject to the reinsurance. The court agreed with Axa that the misrepresentation of ARIG’s loss statistics was a material fact that should have been disclosed. However, even if ARIG had disclosed this information prior to the completion of the underwriting process, Axa would still have entered into the reinsurance agreements. Axa failed to prove they were induced by ARIG’s misrepresentation into the reinsurance contracts; they were therefore bound to those contracts. Axa Versicherung AG v. Arab Insurance Group [2015] EWHC 1939 (Comm).

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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Utica Mutual Insurance Company (“Utica”) sued R&Q Reinsurance Company (“R&Q) in New York federal court for payment under reinsurance certificates R&Q issued to Utica covering umbrella policies Utica issued to its insured, Goulds Pumps, Inc. (“Goulds”) from 1979 to 1981. Some of the policies Utica issued to Goulds did not state the aggregate limits under the policies, but a settlement between Utica and Goulds in an earlier coverage dispute acknowledged that each of the primary policies at issue contained aggregate limits.

In connection with the reinsurance dispute, R&Q sought to compel the production of (1) documents concerning primary insurance policies issued by Utica to other insureds and correspondence reflecting the aggregate limits, and (2) deposition and hearing transcripts from a prior arbitration between Utica and R&Q.

The court declined to compel production of other insureds’ policies, noting that the aggregate limit issue had been litigated and resolved in prior litigation. However, it ordered that the transcripts be produced, but acknowledged that whether the testimony set forth in them would be admissible in the present Utica-R&Q dispute is a different issue. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. R & Q Reinsurance Co., Case No. 6:14-CV-00700 (USDC N.D.N.Y. June 2, 2015)

This post written by John A. Camp.

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