Reinsurance Focus

A California court of appeals has held that the corporate attorney-client privilege extends to confidential communications between an insurer’s employees regarding legal advice and strategy if reasonably necessary for the transmission of that information or to further the purpose of the legal consultation, even when the corporation’s attorneys are not directly involved or when the communications do not include excerpts of direct communications from the attorneys. The trial court, relying on the recommendations of a discovery referee, had determined that only documents created by counsel or involving direct communications between the insurer and its counsel were protected under this privilege. Accordingly, it ordered the production of a number of documents from the insurer’s claim files, which contained reserve and reinsurance information. The insurer sought a writ of mandate from the court of appeals to compel the trial court to vacate this production order. The appellate court concluded that corporations could only act through agents, and that the discussion of legal advice by agents for the purpose of implementing that advice came within the attorney-client privilege, whether or not counsel were directly involved in such discussions. Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, No. B194793 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2007).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

The National Council on Compensation Insurance, as attorney-in-fact for participating companies of the National Workers Compensation Reinsurance Pool, filed a complaint against AIG alleging that AIG engaged in a fraudulent scheme to avoid paying their proportional share of the insurance costs in the residual market for workers compensation insurance. The parties, unable to agree on several terms of a protective order to govern the exchange of confidential information, turned to the district court to resolve their differences on numerous provisions.

The Court made the following key determinations: First, the ‘inadvertent production’ provision would require the receiving party to ‘return, sequester, or destroy’ the information that the producing party claimed had been inadvertently produced. The Court explained that the 2006 Amendments to Rule 26 added the option of sequestration. Second, the Court acknowledged the need for a two-tier definition of confidentiality (“confidential” and “highly confidential – outside counsel’s eyes only”) but limited “highly confidential” documents to those that “(a) must have current applicability to defendant’s business operations, and (b) more likely than not would cause competitive harm to the business operations of the disclosing party.” Lastly, the court rejected defendants’ request to include a provision in the protective order that would require the Court to award damages for any breach of the protective order. National Council on Compensation Ins., Inc. v. American International Group, Case No. 07 C 2898 (USDC N.D.Ill. Dec. 11, 2007).

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.

A plaintiff seeking to compel a defendant insurance company’s disclosure of loss reserves in connection with the plaintiff’s claims of bad faith, breach of contract, and violation of the Washington consumer protection act was not permitted to discover that information, since the plaintiff failed to assert how loss reserve information would be relevant to its claims. The plaintiff was entitled to the production of a reinsurance treaty, which the court held must be produced as part of the “initial disclosures” required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the plaintiff was not permitted to obtain discovery of communications between the defendant and its reinsurer regarding the treaty. The court determined that such communications were irrelevant to the interpretation of the underlying policy. Heights at Issaquah Ridge Owners Ass’n v. Steadfast Insurance Co., Case No. C07-1045RSM (USDC W.D. Wash. Dec. 13, 2007).

This post written by Brian Perryman.

In a recent discovery dispute between Udayan Ghose (the former Chairman of the Board of Directors of New Cap Reinsurance Corporation ) and CNA Reinsurance, a New York trial court compelled CNA to produce underwriting manuals and guidelines, claims handling manuals, and documents concerning whether it sold finite reinsurance. Plaintiffs argued that the underwriting manuals and other such documents were necessary to disprove defendants’ defense of rescission of the D&O liability policy at issue in the litigation. CNA argued that its underwriting materials were irrelevant since a third party (Encon Underwriting) was responsible for underwriting the policy. Because the defendants were arguing that they would not have issued the policy if they had known of certain misrepresentations made by New Cap, the court concluded that the requested documents were discoverable as being relevant to the issue of materiality. Ghose v. CNA Reinsurance Co. Ltd, No. 108121/04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Aug. 20, 2007).

Just a few weeks later, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division issued an opinion on defendants’ appeal of an order denying a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. In a unanimous decision, the Appellate court reversed and granted the motion to dismiss on the condition that the defendants consent to jurisdiction in either Australia, England, or Bermuda, and to waive any statute of limitations defense. The court noted in dicta that if the case had remained in New York state court, it would have sustained an interim award of defense costs, pending resolution of the insurers’ attempt unilaterally to rescind the underlying policy. Ghose v. CNA Reinsurance Co. Ltd, 2007 NY Slip Op 06572 (NY App. Div. Sept. 6, 2007).

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.

This case involves an insurance coverage dispute based on Illinois state law that arose when Defendants denied coverage under five Commercial Crime Insurance Policies insuring Plaintiffs. Defendants asserted that the denial of coverage was justified because plaintiffs failed to comply with notice and loss provisions of the policies. Plaintiffs alleged those clauses were ambiguous.

The present matter came before the court on plaintiff’s motion to compel production of certain documents and information pertaining to Defendant’s reinsurance information. Noting the relatively low threshold necessary to make materials discoverable, the court ruled that such information may be used to support the plaintiff’s attempt to prove an ambiguity in the insurance policy. The court also relied on Seventh Circuit precedent holding that reinsurance agreements are discoverable and the fact that the insurers did not raise an objection to the discoverability of the policies in their briefs or at oral argument. Machinery Movers v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., Case No. 06-C-2539 (USDC N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2007).

This post written by Lynn Hawkins.

This discovery dispute arose out of defendant’s failure to answer certain of plaintiffs’ interrogatories and requests for production of documents relating to defendant’s reinsurance. Defendant, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (“USF&G”), acknowledged having reinsurance, but objected to identifying its reinsurer and producing the reinsurance agreement based on relevancy. Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ request, without prejudice, because the defendant had not notified the reinsurer of the claim. However, the court stated that if the defendant did notify the reinsurer of the claim, then it would be required to supplement its initial disclosures and produce a copy of the reinsurance agreement. Turnell Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Case No. 4:07-cv-1169 (USDC E.D. Mo. Sept. 10, 2007). Background on this matter is found in the Motion to Compel.

Excess Insurance Company reinsured H. S. Weavers on more than 500 reinsurance contracts, and entered into a commutation agreement with Weavers. Rochdale Insurance Company partially reinsured one of the reinsurance agreements. Excess sued Rochdale, and sought production of every document filed by Rochdale with regulatory authorities over a ten year period of time. On a motion to compel, the court held that the request was overbroad. Excess did not state a rationale for the breadth of the request. Counsel had failed to meet and confer on the discovery dispute as required by a local rule, prompting a rebuke from the court. Excess Insurance Co. v. Rochdale Insurance Co., Case No. 05-10174 (USDC S.D. N.Y. October 4, 2007). Background on this dispute may be found in a Memorandum of Law filed in opposition to the motion to compel.

This case, arising from a dispute over insurance coverage following a deadly collision when a tractor trailer struck several other vehicles, was first reported on in a February 28, 2007 posting. Recently, defendant American Re (now known as Munich Re) filed a motion to compel Scottsdale to produce documents. Specifically, American Re sought two categories of documents – documents relating to premium bordereaux and documents relating to underwriting guidelines. With respect to the first request, Scottsdale did not argue the merits of each request, but simply asserted that the requests were irrelevant, overbroad, and burdensome. The court found Scottsdale’s arguments insufficient to bar production, but did limit the timeframe to documents created on or after January 1, 1997.

The court denied American Re’s request with respect to the second category of documents, concluding that American Re did not meet its burden of showing how the requested information was relevant to its claims or defenses. Scottsdale Ins. v. American Re-Insurance Co., Case No. 8:06cv16 (USDC D. Neb. Sept. 10, 2007).

This case presents an interesting arbitration process issue. In 2004, the parties to this action participated in an arbitration, resulting in a $10,000 award to defendant, Smith Barney. Subsequently, plaintiff filed an action to vacate, and defendant moved to confirm the award. In February, 2005 a California district court confirmed the arbitration award. Plaintiff then filed a motion under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to vacate that order, and later filed a Renewed Rule 60 Motion. The renewed motion was filed on the grounds that defendant and its counsel had committed “fraud. . . misrepresentation or other misconduct” by making material misrepresentations to the court. Plaintiff also sought discovery under its motion on the basis of newly discovered case law and evidence. The court granted “limited’ discovery. Plaintiff proceeded to use the limited permission granted by the court to “bombard” Defendant with voluminous discovery. Concluding that the Plaintiff’s discovery requests were “inappropriate in breadth” and “went well beyond the limited subjects referred to in the court’s. . . [o]rder,” the Court denied plaintiff’s motion to compel and granted Smith Barney’s motion for protective order. Sathianathan v. Smith Barney, Case No. C-04-02130 SBA (JCS) (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2007).

The issue presented in this case was whether a statutory provision authorizing limited discovery of a defendant’s insurance coverage information authorized pretrial discovery of a nonparty liability insurer’s reinsurance agreements for purposes of facilitating settlement of an underlying tort action. In a 4-3 decision, the court concluded that while such discovery may be appropriate in limited circumstances, such as where the reinsurance agreement was functioning the same way as a liability policy or where the reinsurance agreement was itself the subject matter of the litigation at hand, the present case did not present such narrow circumstances. The dissenting opinion stated that the relevant statute “unambiguously provides for discovery of reinsurance policies, by including ‘any agreement under which any insurance carrier may be liable to . . . indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.’” Catholic Mutual Relief Society v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, S134545 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 2007).