Reinsurance Focus

A federal district court in Pennsylvania sided with plaintiffs on motions to dismiss filed by the lender, private insurers, and captive reinsurance company in a dispute over premiums charged for private mortgage insurance. Although plaintiffs’ claims were outside the statute of limitations window, the court concluded that equitable tolling applies to RESPA claims, denying defendants’ motions on that issue and allowing plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery on statute of limitations and equitable tolling issues. The court also denied defendants’ motions on the merits of the RESPA and unjust enrichment claims, finding plaintiffs’ argument that the reinsurance relationships are “shams” to be persuasive. Defendants did secure the dismissal of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 claims brought by non-New York plaintiffs, however. Cunningham v. M&T Bank Corp., No. 12-1238 (USDC M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2013).

This post written by Abigail Kortz.

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Resolving a dispute between a reinsured and its reinsurance broker, the UK Commercial Court has held that reinsurance brokers owe a continuing duty to remit money received from reinsurers to their reinsureds. The reinsurance broker conceded that it breached its duty, but argued that the first breach was more than six years (the limitations period) before the litigation was commenced and that the claims are time-barred. The reinsured argued, and the High Court agreed, that the reinsurance broker’s duty is continuous, such that a “fresh cause of action arose on each day when [the broker] failed to make a remittance which it ought to have made.” Equitas Ltd. v. Walsham Bros. & Co., [2013] EWHC (Comm) 3264 (Eng.).

This post written by Abigail Kortz.

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In 2005, former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer commenced a civil enforcement action against AIG, AIG’s former CEO, and AIG’s former CFO Howard Smith for allegedly engaging in fraudulent reinsurance transactions. In response, Smith submitted a Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”) request seeking the disclosure of the AG’s communications with the press regarding the complaint. A New York Supreme Court held that the AG’s office has a responsibility and obligation to gain access to Spitzer’s personal email account to determine if it contains documents that should be disclosed in accordance with the FOIL request. The court, however, also allowed the AG’s office to appeal the issue. On appeal, the Appellate Division determined that Spitzer is a necessary party and remanded the case without deciding the issue so the Supreme Court can order Spitzer’s joinder. Smith v. New York State Office of the Attorney General, No. 515758 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 17, 2013).

This post written by Abigail Kortz.

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In one of the sister cases previously reported on involving Utica Mutual Insurance Company and one of its reinsurers Munich Reinsurance, a federal district court granted Munich’s motion for summary judgment. Utica sought reimbursement under the reinsurance contract for expenses incurred in litigation with an insured. At issue was whether the reinsurance contract subjected those expenses to Munich’s limit of liability or whether Munich was obligated to pay for those expenses in addition to its $5 million limit of liability. Based on Second Circuit and New York Court of Appeals precedent regarding limit-of-liability provisions in reinsurance contracts, the court held that the limit-of-liability provision applicable to Munich was unambiguously cost-inclusive and that Munich was obligated to Utica for no more than the $5 million. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Munich Reinsurance America, Inc., Case No. 6:12-CV-0196 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013).

This post written by Abigail Kortz.

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In a litigation over the extent of liability covered by certain facultative excess general liability reinsurance certificates, a court recently granted a reinsurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing the case. The reinsured sought a declaration that the reinsurance certificates at issue did not contain limits on the reinsurer’s liability for the reinsured’s expenses, and that the reinsurer therefore breached its certificates by failing to pay the full amounts owed for covered expenses under the certificates. The reinsured argued that no limits on liability for expenses were expressly stated in the certificates, and that the certificates’ use of the phrase “in addition thereto” with respect to the reinsurer’s obligation to pay its proportion of expenses, insulated expenses from the certificates’ limits on covered losses. The court rejected the reinsured’s argument, holding there was “nothing in the language of the certificate[s] to suggest that the ‘reinsurance assumed’ amount did not encompass both the ‘reinsurance assumed’ for losses and the ‘reinsurance assumed’ for expenses,” and that this interpretation “is in accord with the majority of cases that have dealt with similar reinsurance certificates.” The court also rejected the reinsured’s alternative argument that the certificates were ambiguous. Continental Casualty Co. v. Midstates Reinsurance Co., Case No. 12 CH 42911 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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When a reinsurer refused to reimburse two AIG insurance companies for the insurers’ losses arising out of asbestos litigation, the AIG companies made a demand for a single arbitration under three reinsurance agreements between the parties. The reinsurer delayed the process of appointing an arbitration panel by asserting that differences between the contracts warranted three separate arbitrations. The insurers petitioned the court to appoint an umpire – two other arbitrators having already been appointed by the parties – under Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration and the reinsurer petitioned the court to order separate arbitrations under Section 4 of the Act. The court refused both parties’ demands, concluding that both issues would require the court to decide the core dispute: whether the insurers’ demand for a single arbitration was improper. The court ordered the parties to proceed with the agreed upon arbitrator selection process, so that the single arbitration panel could address the issue of whether the demand for a single arbitration was improper. Granite State Insurance Co. v. Clearwater Insurance Co., Case No. C 13-2924 (USDC N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013).

This post written by Abigail Kortz.

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On September 29, 2009 and November 22, 2010, respectively, we reported on a court’s vacatur of an arbitration award related to a “deficit carry forward” provision in a reinsurance agreement, and the Third Circuit’s subsequent affirmance of that order. The dispute surrounded the manner in which deficits in a reinsurer’s “experience account” under a reinsurance agreement for one year, applies to distribution of account funds under a separate reinsurance agreement for a subsequent year. The court previously vacated an arbitration award that awarded the reinsurer $6 million and failed to apply the “deficit carry forward” provision, which the court found to be unsupported by the contract and therefore “completely irrational” (notwithstanding a broad “Honorable Engagement Clause”). In a recent opinion and order, the court affirmed the award of a new arbitration panel, which interpreted the agreements and found that the “deficit carry forward” provision applied to permit the reinsurer to retain its portion of the account deficits prior to distribution to the reinsured of the funds of the account for the subsequent year. Because the panel “grounded its decision on the language” of the relevant reinsurance agreement, the court found that the panel’s decision properly “draws its essence” from the contract. Platinum Underwriters Bermuda, Ltd. v. Excalibur Reinsurance Corp., Case No. 2:12-mc-00070 (USDC E.D. Pa. July 15, 2013), and corresponding judgment entered July 18, 2013.

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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Grosvenor v. Qwest Corp., No. 12-1095 (10th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013) (dismissing Qwest’s appeal of district court’s order granting partial summary judgment because Qwest did not seek to compel arbitration in its motion for summary judgment and therefore did not properly invoke appellate jurisdiction under the FAA).

PoolRe Insurance Corp. v. Organizational Strategies, Inc., No. H-13-1857 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 29, 2013) (denying plaintiff’s motion to compel first arbitration because same motion was pending in the Delaware federal district court; staying ongoing arbitration proceedings in a second arbitration between the same parties, having determined that the claims are clearly not arbitrable because they were carved out of the arbitration clause by a separate agreement).

Marsh & McLennan Cos. v. GIO Insurance Ltd., No. 11 Civ. 8391 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2013) (staying action pending arbitration, rather than dismissing action, because dismissal is an appealable order that could further delay quick resolution through arbitration; denying defendant insurance company’s motion to release the $1.5 million security it was required to deposit with the court as an “unauthorized foreign insurer,” favoring New York’s public policy that a foreign insurer’s funds should be available in New York to satisfy any potential judgment).

Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, Inc., No. 070751 (N.J. Aug. 7, 2013) (reversing Appellate Division’s affirmance of Law Divison’s grant of defendants’ motion to compel arbitration because intertwinement of claims and parties alone is insufficient to warrant application of equitable estoppel to compel arbitration).

McInnes v. LPL Financial, LLC, No. SJC-11356 (Mass. Aug. 12, 2013) (vacating order denying defendants’ motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration and holding that claims alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of Gen. Law ch. 93A, § 9 must be referred to arbitration where the contract involves interstate commerce and the arbitration agreement is enforceable under the FAA).

Brown v. MHN Government Services, Inc., No. 87953-2 (Wash. Aug. 15, 2013) (affirming order denying appellant MHN’s motion to compel arbitration, applying California law according to choice of law provision in arbitration and agreement and finding provisions regarding arbitrator selection, statute of limitations, and fee shifting to be unconscionable, thereby rendering the entire arbitration agreement unenforceable).

This post written by Abigail Kortz.

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An insurer’s bid to remove a lawsuit to federal court was stymied. The case involved a “service of suit” paragraph in an insurance policy permitting the insured to select the venue and forum of a dispute under the policy. The court found that the insurer waived the right to remove an action from state to federal court, notwithstanding a provision purporting to preserve the insurer’s right to “seek a transfer” of the case. The court interpreted consecutively each sentence of the relevant paragraph “like the concentric rings of a target.” Among other things, the court considered whether the phrase “seek a transfer” contemplated seeking removal of the action to federal court. That phrase did not include seeking removal, notwithstanding caselaw that had reached a different result in the context of a different forum selection clause employing the word “transfer” in a grammatically and substantively different way. Hanover Insurance Group, Inc. v. Chartis Specialty Insurance Co., Case No. 4:12-cv-40156 (USDC D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2013).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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We have reported on several putative class actions brought by purchasers of private mortgage insurance who allege that insurers, lenders, and captive reinsurers unlawfully entered into reinsurance arrangements in violation of the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and other laws. There have been some recent developments in such cases involving RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations.

In Munoz, as we reported in May, a federal magistrate judge in California recommended certification of a class of purchasers of private mortgage insurance whose insurance was included in defendants’ captive reinsurance arrangements. The magistrate judge recently granted a motion to intervene brought by a putative class member who was excluded from the recommended class because her claims were time-barred. The magistrate had not included such persons in the recommended class because their claims were atypical and class plaintiffs, whose claims were not similarly time-barred, had no interest in asserting tolling of the statute of limitations. In the order granting the motion to intervene the parties were instructed to conduct discovery on and brief the issue of whether certification of a tolling subclass is appropriate. Munoz v. PHH Corp., Case No. 1:08-cv-00759 (USDC E.D. Cal. July 29, 2013).

In Menichino, a Pennsylvania federal district court dismissed without prejudice plaintiff’s putative class action complaint alleging RESPA violations premised on alleged kickbacks relating to defendants’ private mortgage insurance and captive reinsurance arrangements. The court held that plaintiff’s complaint was time-barred by RESPA’s one-year statute of limitations and that plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts which, taken as true, would have established that RESPA’s limitations period should be tolled. Menichino v. Citibank, N.A., Case No. 12-0058 (USDC W.D. Pa. July 19, 2013).

The court reached the identical conclusion in Manners, a related case, and similarly dismissed the putative class plaintiff’s claims without prejudice. Manners v. Fifth Third Bank, Case No. 12-0442 (USDC W.D. Pa. July 19, 2013).

This post written by Ben Seessel.

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