Reinsurance Focus

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a Florida district court’s denial of Cashcall’s motion to compel arbitration, as the forum selected in the parties’ loan agreement was not available.  Appellee Abraham Inetianbor initially borrowed $2,600 from Western Sky Financial LLC. He subsequently repaid $3,252.65 to the servicer of the loan, CashCall, over twelve months. Mr. Inetianbor refused to pay a subsequent bill from Cashcall because he believed his financial obligations had been fulfilled. CashCall disagreed, and reported Mr. Inetianbor’s purported default to credit agencies. Mr. Inetianbor then sued, inter alia, for defamation and usury violations.

The loan agreement mandated any dispute be arbitrated by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation (the “Tribe”). Despite attempts to comply with arbitration, the Tribe explained to Mr. Inetianbor and the district court on multiple occasions that the Tribe does not authorize arbitration.  CashCall argued that the specified arbitral forum was not integral to the agreement, and therefore its unavailability should not cause the court to deny its motion to compel. The Court looked to “how important the term was to one or both of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement” – to determine whether the arbitration agreement is integral. In this case, the agreement made multiple references to the Tribe. In nine paragraphs regarding arbitration in the contract, the Tribe was specifically mentioned in five of them. The Court concluded that the contract’s use of “shall” and “is required to” was sufficient evidence of the intent to make the Tribal arbitral forum the exclusive forum.  Since that arbitral forum was unavailable, Appellant’s motion to compel arbitration was denied.  Inetianbor v. Cashcall, Inc., No. 13-cv-60066-JIC (11th Cir. 2014).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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A California appellate court recently examined that state’s legislative response to the situation where a party moves to compel arbitration and some of the parties to the dispute are not parties to the arbitration agreement. In a situation including an arbitration provision of a reinsurance agreement, the court interpreted the so-called “third party litigation exception” to compelling arbitration, which according to the Court of Appeals addresses “the special practical problems that arise in multiparty contractual disputes when some or all of the contracts at issue include agreements to arbitrate.” Section 1281.2(c) of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that a court need not order arbitration if it determines that: (1) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party; (2) the dispute arises out of the same transaction or series of related transactions; and (3) there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.  The court concluded that the California statute was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, relying on an opinion of the Untied States Supreme Court which held that the application of the third party litigation exception of section 1281.2(c) to stay the arbitration of a contract dispute involving interstate commerce did not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA, and was not preempted by the FAA.  Arrow Recycling Solutions, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., No. B245379 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2015), modified (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2015).

This post written by Catherine Acree.

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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has dismissed, for lack of appellate jurisdiction, a district court order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Certain Underwriters of Lloyds of London and several other insurance companies. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s order was not a final, appealable order within the meaning of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or the Federal Arbitration Act. The district court had granted the motion after finding the insurance contract at issue contained a clear and unambiguous arbitration clause, and had then stayed the case and closed it for administrative purposes. The Fifth Circuit found the district court’s order and administrative closure lacked the finality necessary for appellate jurisdiction, noting a “clear distinction” between final orders dismissing cases after compelling arbitration and interlocutory orders staying and administratively closing cases pending arbitration. The district court’s order was deemed to be the latter and the appeal was therefore dismissed. Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, No. 13-31130 (5th Cir. Nov. 24, 2014).

This post written by Renee Schimkat.

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In early September, a New York district court granted defendants United States Polo Association, Inc. (“USPA”) and Arvind Ltd.’s (“Arvind”) motion to compel arbitration. It further dismissed Ralph Lauren Corporation and its subsidiaries’ (collectively “Ralph Lauren”) complaint alleging breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, and unjust enrichment.

This action was the latest in a longstanding battle between Ralph Lauren and the USPA, who have been actively involved in trademark litigation since 1984. A 2003 settlement resolved disputes concerning USPA’s use of logos and trademarks with their sale of apparel. The settlement further contained an arbitration provision that would govern any dispute between the parties arising from the settlement agreement.

Ralph Lauren alleged that USPA/Arvind breached this settlement agreement by selling products that infringed upon their protected trademarks without language that indicated that the two companies were not affiliated. It also alleged that the defendants waived arbitration by filing to enforce arbitration in India instead of New York. The court rejected Ralph Lauren’s argument that the defendants waived their right to arbitration because Ralph Lauren showed neither substantive prejudice nor prejudice due to excessive cost and time delay. The court found that USPA/Arvind were not attempting to re-litigate any issue in arbitration. It further noted that “[i]t was the Polo plaintiffs, not USPA/Arvind, that filed the present action in the Southern District of New York and that postponed the arbitration proceedings in India,” negating a claim for excessive cost and delay. Finally, the court found that Ralph Lauren’s fraudulent inducement and remaining claims should be handled through arbitration. Ralph Lauren Corp. v. United States Polo Ass’n, No. 13 Civ. 7147 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2014).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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An architectural firm contracted to provide architectural, engineering and design services for a state veterans home for a “not to exceed fee” of $61,500, which was calculated as a percentage of overall expected construction costs. When there were changes to the scope of the construction, the construction costs increased, and the firm sought an additional fee. The request was denied, an administrative appeal was rejected and suit was filed. The parties stipulated to a stay of the lawsuit pending a statutory arbitration procedure. The arbitration was resolved adversely to the claimant, with the arbitrator declaring that he was not deciding any equitable claims the claimant may have had which were not asserted in the arbitration. The arbitration award was confirmed by agreement and no appeal was filed. The claimant then filed a petition to compel a second arbitration of equitable claims. The court denied the petition, holding that the proposed equitable claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed, holding that the claimant could have asserted the equitable claims in the first arbitration, and that the scope of precluded claims was determined using the transaction test, i.e., whether the claims arose out of the same transaction or series of connected transactions. Finding that the equitable claims arose out of the same transactions as the previously arbitrated claims, and finding no applicable exception to the preclusion doctrine, the Supreme Court ruled that the unasserted equitable claims were barred by the final judgment confirming the award in the first arbitration. Torrado Architects v. Rhode Island Dept. of Human Services, No. 2013-274 (R.I. Nov. 25, 2014).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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In a complicated web of proceedings, the initial dispute involved whether the reinsurer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., was permitted to condition payment of reinsurance claims on receiving access to the claim records of the cedent, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. The arbitration award construed the treaty’s payment provisions as independent of the access to records provision, and ruled that Nationwide must take a coverage position within 60 days of submission of a claim. An additional dispute then arose when Nationwide disputed enforcement of the award against certain reinsurance claims subsequently re-submitted by Liberty Mutual. Various filings were made in state and federal court and with the arbitration panel, including Liberty’s motion to enforce the arbitration award (in state court), and Nationwide’s motion to compel another arbitration (in federal court). The federal district court stayed Nationwide’s motion, pending a ruling by the state court on Liberty’s motion (see our March 13, 2014 post). Ultimately, the panel issued a ruling purporting to “clarify” the initial award, and the state court entered a ruling enforcing the initial award to the extent it had prospective application.

The federal court has now lifted its stay, and compelled arbitration on the meaning of “future claims” under the treaty and whether Liberty Mutual’s resubmitted claims would qualify as such. The federal court declined, however, to compel arbitration again on the issue of access to records under the treaty, which the court deemed barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. The court also vacated the arbitration panel’s interim ruling purporting to clarify the initial award. The court held that the panel’s clarification was untimely, having been sought more than six months after the original award was entered and after the award had been confirmed. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., Case Nos. 13-cv-12910, 14-cv-12046 (USDC D. Mass. Nov. 6, 2014).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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An arbitration agreement was contained in a retail installment contract. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the case pending arbitration against a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement on two grounds: (1) the dispute, which involved the parties’ obligations under the retail installment contract, had a “significant relationship” to the contract; and (2) the plaintiff’s claims relied on the contract and the plaintiff was therefore “equitably estopped from disclaiming the contract’s arbitration provision.” Lomax v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, P.A., No. 14-1130 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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Joca-Roca Real Estate, LLC sued Robert T. Brennan asserting claims of fraud and breach of contract arising out of an agreement between the two parties which contained an arbitration clause. Although Brennan raised the failure to arbitrate as an affirmative defense, it never pursued arbitration. Instead, the parties engaged in significant discovery. On the eve of trial, Joca-Roca moved to stay the proceedings pending arbitration. Both the magistrate judge and the district court denied the motion to stay, finding that Joca-Roca waived its arbitral rights.

On appeal, the First Circuit noted that, while federal law favors agreements to arbitrate, arbitration clauses can be waived expressly or through conduct. In determining whether a conduct-based waiver occurred, a court must ascertain whether there has been undue delay in the assertion of arbitral rights and whether, if arbitration supplanted litigation, the other party would suffer unfair prejudice. The longer the delay and the more extensive the litigation-related activities that have taken place, the stronger the inference of prejudice. Joca-Roca’s attempt to invoke the arbitration was deemed not only untimely, but unsupported by an explanation for the belated request. Moreover, during this time, Brennan was prejudiced because he was forced to engage in discovery which would not have been required in arbitration. The prejudice to Brennan was even greater given the looming trial date. On this basis, the First Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling denying Joca-Roca’s motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration. Joca-Roca Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan, No. 14-1353 (1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2014).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

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Randazzo Enterprises sued its reinsurer, Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc. in California federal court over Applied’s calculation of premiums of the reinsurance agreement entered between them. Invoking the arbitration clause set forth in the reinsurance agreement, Applied filed a demand for arbitration and, in the pending federal case, moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss Randazzo’s complaint. The court determined it must first consider whether a valid arbitration clause exists and, if so, whether the arbitration encompasses the dispute at issue. To do so, the court found it must apply ordinary state law principles governing the formation and construction of contracts. Applying these principles to the facts before it, the court first rejected Randazo’s argument that the arbitration clause was unenforceable under Nebraska law which the parties agreed would govern. Nebraska law only applied to issues of substantive law and not to arbitration. Moreover, even if Nebraska law were to apply, it was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.

The court then turned to Randazzo’s argument that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Under California law, a contract must be unconscionable both procedurally and substantively in order to be rendered invalid. Here, because Randazzo had no opportunity to negotiate the arbitration provision, the agreement was an adhesion contract and therefore procedurally unconscionable. The Court then analyzed whether two specific provisions were substantively unconscionable. Under California law, a contract is substantively unconscionable when it is so one-sided that “it shocks the conscience.” The provision regarding the choice of arbitrator, requiring the arbitrators to be active or retired disinterested officials of insurance or reinsurance companies, was not substantively unconscionable. However, the provision which allowed only Applied to seek injunctive relief in Court was found substantively unconscionable, since it exceeded the rights afforded parties in an arbitration under California law and was so one-sided that it could not be justified as a legitimate commercial need. However, because California law permits a court to sever an unconscionable provision from an agreement, the parties’ agreement was not invalid because that one clause could easily be stricken without the need to reform the agreement. Finally, the court concluded that Randazzo’s claims related to the execution, delivery, construction or enforceability of the reinsurance contract, such that all of Randazzo’s claims were subject to arbitration. Randazzo Enterprises, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Case No. 5:14-CV-02374-EJD (USDC N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014).

This post written by Leonor Lagomasino.

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A district court in Pennsylvania has denied a motion to vacate a prior arbitration award based on the arbitrator’s alleged manifest disregard of the law, and instead granted a motion to confirm the award in a case arising out of the termination of the claimant’s employment. The claimant, Mrs. Cartwright, contended that the arbitrators committed manifest disregard of the law when they dismissed her Title VII retaliation claim. The Court found that based on the evidence and testimony from the President and CEO the bank which had employed Mrs. Cartwright, Ms. Cartwright’s own efforts to hinder the company’s planned merger could well have been the reason for her firing. While the Court noted that evidence stood both for and against Ms. Cartwright’s claims, this fact did not mean “that particular claim was a ‘but for’ cause of her dismissal.”

Ms. Cartwright also contended that the arbitrators committed manifest disregard of the law when they awarded damages on her breach of contract claim but dismissed an additional fraud claim. The Court noted that fraud claims can be enmeshed with breach of contract claims. As both the fraud and breach of contract claims were based on the same set of facts, the arbitrators had a basis to bar the fraud claim. Cartwright v. Fidelity Bank, No. 2:12-cv-01502 (W.D.Pa. Sep. 24, 2014).

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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