Reinsurance Focus

A purchaser filed a putative state class action against a car dealer alleging state law violations related to the sale of automobiles. The car dealer filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in the sales contract, which also contained a class action waiver. The trial court determined that the class action waiver was unenforceable, and, based upon this denial, a “poison pill” clause in the contract went into effect making the entire arbitration provision unenforceable. The trial court’s invalidation of the class arbitration waiver provision arguably could not stand in light of the US Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility LL v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). However, the Court of Appeals affirmed based upon another ground, that the arbitration provision itself was a product of adhesion and unequal bargaining power and hence unconscionable. The court found that Concepcion preserved the ability of state courts to invalidate entire arbitration provisions on the basis of unconscionability. However, the California “Discover Bank rule” disapproved by the Supreme Court in Concepcion was premised on a conclusion that the class arbitration waiver was the product of adhesion, and the Supreme Court found that justification insufficient to overcome the objectives of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Sanchez court’s invalidation of the entire arbitration provision on the same ground may raise a question as to whether this decision is consistent with the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Concepcion. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, No. BC433634 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2011). The Court of Appeals granted a petition for rehearing and issued a modified opinion affirming the lower court’s decision. In the new opinion, the Court of Appeals emphasized that unconscionability itself survived the Concepcion ruling, and that here, the unconscionability permeated the entire agreement with numerous unconscionable clauses. Again, the Court of Appeals took pains to limit the scope of the Supreme Court’s Concepcion opinion. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, B228027 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011).

This post written by John Black.

Manifest Disregard:

Zimmerman Ag and Cattle Co. v. Agro National, LLC, No. CV-11-29 (USDC D. Mont. Nov. 7, 2011) (denying motion to vacate, finding “mere error of law” insufficient to satisfy manifest disregard standard).

Rite Aid New Jersey, Inc. v. United Food Commercial Workers Union, Local 1360, No. 10-3558 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2011) (affirming denial of motion to vacate award, no manifest disregard).

New York City Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Star Intercom & Construction, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 03015 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2011) (granting motion to confirm arbitrator decision of default judgment against respondent, where arbitrator did not “dispense his own brand of justice,” no basis for vacatur).

Activant Solutions, Inc. v. Notoco Industries, LLC, No. C-11-02436 (USDC N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (granting petition to confirm, no manifest disregard for arbitrator’s refusal to modify award).

Conflict of Laws:

Southern Pioneer Life Insurance Co. v. Thomas, No. 11-426 (Ark. Nov. 17, 2011) (affirming denial of motion to compel arbitration, holding FAA preempted by McCarran-Ferguson Act vis-à-vis Arkansas statute precluding arbitration of claims under insurance contracts).

Evident Partiality:

In re Wal-Mart Wage and Hour Employment Practices Litigation, No. 2:06-CV-00225-PMP-PAL (USDC D. Nev. Oct. 11, 2011) (granting motion to confirm, finding no “evident partiality” where arbitrator raised ethical issues pertaining to respondent’s counsel).

Patrizzi & Co. Auctioneers SA v. SDG Corp., No. 11-C-3589 (USDC N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2011) (granting motion to confirm, no “evident partiality” in allowing one party to submit evidence not on pretrial list and not the other party).

Exceeding Arbitrator’s Authority:

Verve Communications Pvt Ltd. v. Software Int’l, Inc., No. 11-1280 (USDC D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2011) (denying motion to vacate, arbitrator did not exceed authority by closing discovery period over objection and making award).

Choice Hotels Int’l v. Savannah Shakti Corp., No. DKC-11-0438 (USDC D. Md. Oct. 25, 2011) (granting motion for default, arbitrator’s default award on contract claims did not exceed scope of submission).

Class Arbitration:

Southern Communications Services, Inc. v. Thomas, 1:10-CV-2975-AT (USDC N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2011) (denying motion to vacate award holding class arbitration allowable, and granting class certification).

Scope of Arbitration:

Shah v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. d/b/a Drive Financial Services, LP, No. 3:11-CV-00096 (USDC D. Conn. Nov. 16, 2011) (motion to compel arbitration granted, finding statutory claims “collateral matters” that implicate rights created under the contract).

Stay Pending Appeal / Appellate Jurisdiction:

Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, No. 11-20676 (5th Cir. Nov. 1, 2011) (affirming district court ruling denying stay of proceedings during pendency of appeal of decision denying motion to compel arbitration).

TransAmerica Life Insurance Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., No. 01-11-00240-CV (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2011) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction, trial court order regarding offset to previously entered judgment non-appealable).

This post written by John Pitblado.

As we reported on November 1, 2011, a federal district court disqualified counsel for Insco, Ltd. because counsel had improperly procured and reviewed emails between members of an arbitration panel touching on deliberations in the ongoing arbitration. Insco moved for reconsideration of this decision and sought leave to file a declaration of one of its attorneys in support of its motion. The court denied Insco’s request, finding that nothing in the declaration raised new arguments or facts that had not been pursued in Insco’s opposition to Northwestern National’s motion to disqualify. The court will limit its decision on the motion for reconsideration to the record before it on Northwestern National’s original motion. Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Insco, Ltd., Case No. 11-1124 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2011).

This post written by Ben Seessel.

Sara Krinsk filed a putative class action lawsuit against SunTrust Bank, alleging that it improperly revoked a line of credit on her home, based on an alleged company wide policy to dispatch with certain credit risks after issues with collateralized mortgage debt came to light in 2008 and 2009. After participating in the litigation for nine months, and after plaintiff amended her complaint greatly enlarging the putative class, SunTrust moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the parties’ contract, which also precluded class arbitration. The district court denied the motion, finding SunTrust had waived its right to arbitrate due to its participation in the litigation to that point. SunTrust appealed, arguing that the Plaintiff’s amendment of her complaint shortly before SunTrust moved to compel arbitration revived its right to arbitrate anew. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, finding the case presented “one of those limited circumstances” warranting revival of arbitration rights because the amended complaint significantly altered the scope of the case. Krinsk v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., No. 10-11912 (11th Cir. Sept. 7, 2011)

This post written by John Pitblado.

A federal circuit court of appeals reversed a lower court order vacating an arbitration award because the arbitrators had “exceeded their powers” by purportedly failing to provide a “reasoned award” as agreed upon by the parties. Cat Charter, LLC and its principals initiated an arbitration against Multihull Technologies, Inc. and its owner to resolve a dispute involving the construction of a yacht. The parties requested a “reasoned award” from the panel. According to the district court, the arbitrators failed to deliver an award that was sufficiently “reasoned,” exceeding their powers under Federal Arbitration Act section 10(4)(a). The court of appeals analyzed what it termed the “spectrum of increasingly reasoned awards” that runs from a “standard award,” which merely announces a decision, to “findings of fact and conclusions of law,” which requires “relatively exacting” detail. The appellate court found that a “reasoned award” was somewhere in the middle of the spectrum and that the panel’s award, though “it could have provided more,” gave a sufficiently detailed explanation to be considered “reasoned.” The appeals court reinstated the award, noting that if the parties had desired more detail, they could have requested that the arbitrators provide “findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Cat Charter 11th Cir 7.13.11, No. 10-11674 (11th Cir. July 13, 2011).

This post written by Ben Seessel.

A state court recently distinguished the U.S. Supreme Court’s Concepcion decision in upholding a prior order that found that arbitration agreements that precluded class arbitration were void as against public policy. A putative consumer class action was brought against Dell Inc. by plaintiffs who had agreed to arbitrate disputes only on an individual basis – and not as a class action. Dell initially prevailed in arbitration, but the appellate court subsequently reversed the award, holding that the agreement barring class arbitration violated state public policy and was unenforceable. After the appellate court issued its ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Concepcion case, which held the FAA preempts state laws that preclude class action waivers. Arguing that Concepcion rejected the appellate court’s decision in this case, Dell renewed its underlying motion to confirm the arbitration award. The court denied Dell’s motion, distinguishing Concepcion on its facts. Whereas the plaintiffs in Concepcion had sizable individual claims and a favorable procedure in place to arbitrate individual claims, the plaintiffs in this case had small individual claims and no favorable individual claim resolution procedure. State policy against a class waiver prevailed in this case because arbitration of individual claims was “infeasible as a matter of fact” leaving no “federal interest with which the state law might conflict.” Since this rationale arguably is similar to those underlying state law provisions vulnerable under Conception, it will be interesting to see whether this position prevails. Feeney v. Dell, Inc., Case No. MICV 2003-01158 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

The U.S. Supreme Court has issued a per curiam decision holding that the Federal Arbitration Act must be enforced in both state and federal courts. In this case, a Florida state court of appeal upheld a trial court’s refusal to compel arbitration after determining that two of the four claims in a complaint were nonarbitrable. The Supreme Court cited prior precedent requiring that courts send arbitrable claims to arbitration even if it will lead to piecemeal litigation. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985). The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case so that the lower court could determine if any of the claims were arbitrable. KPMG, LLP v. Cocchi, No. 10-1521, 565 U.S. – (U.S. Nov. 7, 2011).

This post written by John Black.

White Springs Agricultural Chemicals, Inc. and Glawson Investments Corp. had a history of property dispute litigation arising from their respective uses of neighboring properties in Florida. They stipulated to a settlement, agreeing that future disputes would be arbitrated. A dispute again arose, and Glawson demanded arbitration in accordance with the agreement. The parties arbitrated, and the panel found in Glawson’s favor, awarding attorneys fees and costs. White Springs sought to vacate the award in federal court, arguing the fee award was improper and beyond the scope of the submission. The court disagreed, confirming the award. White Springs appealed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, citing the agreement for the panel’s authority to award attorneys fees, and noting that, while Glawson had not initially sought fees, it was apparent the parties had submitted that issue to the arbitration panel, inasmuch as both parties briefed the issue, and the panel heard argument on the issue before issuing the award. White Springs Agricultural Chemicals, Inc. v. Glawson Investments Corp., No. 10-14532 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2011).

This post written by John Pitblado.

A dispute arose between Century Indemnity Company and Everest Reinsurance Company over reinsurance coverage for certain asbestos claims. The parties each selected an arbitrator pursuant to the procedure set forth in their reinsurance treaty. Unable to reach agreement on the selection of a neutral umpire, Everest filed an action seeking appointment of an umpire or, in the alternative, to compel Century to participate in an ARIAS neutral umpire selection process. After Everest filed its complaint, however, Century agreed to the ARIAS process as part of a global agreement involving the arbitration (the “Formosa Arbitration”), and two other pending arbitrations (the “Congoleum Arbitration” and the “Flintkote Arbitration”), mooting the issue. Everest thereafter moved to enforce the global agreement, complaining that Century had sought to consolidate the Congoleum Arbitration with another arbitration that was not part of the agreement, and in which a panel of arbitrators had already been selected, circumventing the agreed-upon panel selection process. The court denied Everest’s motion on the basis that it was outside the complaint’s scope, which merely sought appointment of a neutral umpire in the Formosa Arbitration. To obtain relief regarding the Congoleum Arbitration, Everest could file a motion with the Congoleum Arbitration panel or in the court where other motions relating to that proceeding were pending. Everest Reinsurance Co. v. Century Indemnity Co., Case No. 11-2789 (USDC D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2011).

This post written by Ben Seessel.

A court recently compelled arbitration in a dispute between an insured and an insurer-risk retention group, concluding that the McCarren-Ferguson Act did not mandate the enforcement of a state anti-arbitration law over the FAA and broad arbitration agreements between the parties. The court held that while McCarran-Ferguson was met to the extent that (1) the federal law (the FAA) impaired the state insurance law, and that (2) the FAA does not clearly relate to the “business of insurance,” here the relationship between the parties was not a classic insurance relationship. The insurer was not a public offering insurance company, but rather a risk retention group, which necessitates the application of the federal Liability Risk Retention Act, a law that preempts state laws that impair the “formation or operation” of risk retention groups. The court concluded that such an impairment existed in this case because the state law prohibiting arbitration would significantly increase the costs of litigation, adversely affecting the risk retention group’s operations. Central Claims Service, Inc. v. Claim Professionals Liability Insurance Co., Case No. 10-04672 (USDC E.D. La. Sept. 2, 2011).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.