Reinsurance Focus

The case involved motions to compel arbitration by multiple defendants, all of which were parties to contracts with the plaintiff, an association captive insurer, but only some of which had signed contracts containing arbitration provisions. The court compelled the plaintiff to arbitrate breach of contract and related claims with the arbitration-signatories, finding that the claims fell under the arbitration provisions’ scope, which covered all disputes “arising out of” the underlying contracts. The court rejected, however, a non-arbitration-signatory’s attempt to compel the plaintiff to arbitrate under an estoppel theory, finding that the nonsignatory was “really arguing” that the court should read the arbitration clause into its non-arbitration agreements. Notwithstanding the court’s decision to only partly compel arbitration, it did stay the entire litigation, finding that some of the issues or claims might eliminate certain issues against the non-arbitration-signatory, and that the arbitration would likely proceed expeditiously. J.M. Woodworth Risk Retention Group, Inc. v. Uni-Ter Underwriting Management Corp., Case No. 2:13-cv-00911 (USDC D. Nev. Sept. 11, 2013).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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In an ongoing reinsurance arbitration between Allstate Insurance Company and OneBeacon American Insurance Company, Allstate unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the arbitration because OneBeacon’s position statement informed the umpire of OneBeacon’s selection of him as umpire. Allstate alleged that this submission (1) violated the arbitration agreement’s umpire selection protocol, which, Allstate argued, implicitly prohibited communications that threatened umpire impartiality, and (2) violated the “reinsurance industry’s custom and practice.” Allstate could not make the requisite showing of “likelihood of success on the merits” to obtain injunctive relief because it misinterpreted the selection protocol, and because “[p]reaward challenges on the basis of bias” are not permitted. Allstate also failed to show “irreparable harm,” given Allstate’s ability to challenge the final award after the arbitration was completed. Concern over potential “lack of neutrality” did not tip the balance of equities in Allstate’s favor, nor did a “technical skirmish over arbitration procedure between two reinsurance companies” rank high in terms of the public’s interest. Allstate Insurance Co. v. OneBeacon American Insurance Co., Case No. 1:13-cv-12368 (USDC D. Mass. Oct. 8, 2013).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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The District of Connecticut recently granted a motion to compel arbitration in a suit brought by Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (“CGLIC”) for a fraudulent overbilling scheme allegedly perpetrated by participating providers of outpatient medical imaging services. The court’s analysis hinged on (1) whether CGLIC’s claim fell within the scope of the arbitration clause at issue and (2) whether the defendants, neither of whom were signatories to the contracts containing the arbitration clause, may enforce the clause against CGLIC, who, though not a signatory either, conceded that it is an intended third-party beneficiary of the contracts.

With respect to scope, the court distinguished between “broad” and “narrow” clauses, relying on CardioNet, Inc. v. CIGNA Health Corp., Case No. 13-cv-191 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2013), to conclude that the clause, which applied to “[d]isputes arising with respect to the performance or interpretation” of the contracts, was broad and thus deserving of a presumption of arbitrability. The court also invoked judicial estoppel, as a CGLIC affiliate had urged the broad construction in CardioNet, foreclosing CGLIC’s right to later argue for a narrow reading. With respect to the authority of non-signatories to enforce the clause, the court held that, because third-party beneficiaries are bound by the terms of the contracts that benefit them, CGLIC was bound to arbitration as if it were a signatory. The court also held that the non-signatory defendants could compel arbitration because (1) the factual issues of the dispute were intertwined with the contracts containing the arbitration clauses, (2) a parent-subsidiary-like relationship existed between the non-signatory defendants and the signatory imaging servicers, and (3) the conduct underlying the claim involved both signatory and non-signatory parties. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Houston Scheduling Services, Inc., Case No. 3:12-cv-01456 (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2013).

This post written by Kyle Whitehead.

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Absent a “pressing need,” an arbitration action and related court case in one federal district do not justify an indefinite stay of a court case in a different federal district when different reinsurance contracts and different merits are at issue, regardless of whether the parties are the same. In Employers Insurance Company of Wausau v. OneBeacon Insurance Company, a garden-variety breach of contract claim, the Western District of Wisconsin recently entertained, and subsequently rejected, OneBeacon’s motion to stay arguments (1) that a Massachusetts arbitration award could eventually result in a setoff against an expected Wisconsin judgment and (2) that Employers Insurance Company of Wausau’s dawdling conduct in arbitration could be positively impacted by an indefinite stay in court. Holding that a potential setoff is not a “pressing need” and that concerns regarding party conduct should be raised in the forum in which that conduct occurs, the court ultimately granted summary judgment to Employers because OneBeacon had not disputed its liability under the Wisconsin contracts. It also awarded Employers prejudgment interest pursuant to Wisconsin law. Employers Insurance Co. of Wausau v. OneBeacon Insurance Co., Case No. 13-cv-85-bbc (W.D. Wis. July 8, 2013).

This post written by Kyle Whitehead.

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A recent California district court ruling denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration in an employment dispute, and also certified a class against the defendant. The district court found that the defendant waived its right to arbitrate through litigation conduct. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, reversing, and remanding with instructions to order the plaintiff and defendant to arbitrate, because the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate any prejudice arising from the “litigation conduct” which the district court found constituted a waiver. The Court also vacated the district court’s certification order, noting that the parties’ employment agreement prohibited class arbitration. Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. 11-17530 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2013).

This post written by John Pitblado.

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The court compelled arbitration in a dispute over asbestos insurance coverage that had reached an impasse after six years of mediation. The insured sought to compel arbitration against the insurer and the insurer’s nonsignatory subsidiary, which had purportedly separately contracted with the insurer to reimburse a portion of the risk. The court compelled arbitration against the subsidiary because the insured had entered into a broad agreement with the subsidiary to arbitrate disputes related to asbestos claims, and the threshold question of whether the subsidiary agreed to provide insurance coverage was subject to arbitration. The court also compelled arbitration against the signatory insurer over the insurer’s objection that it had a separate written agreement with the insured to resolve disputes only through litigation. The court found that although the insurer never agreed to arbitrate, the insurer had “exploited” the arbitration agreement of its subsidiary by mediating the dispute for six years. The insurer was estopped from avoiding arbitration because the insured had relied on the insurer’s “exploit[s]” to its detriment, having “lost the time value of money” and “spent six years attempting to reach resolution through mediation.” Fintkote Co. v. Indemnity Marine Assurance Co., Case No. 1:13-cv-00935 (USDC D. Del. Sept. 30, 2013).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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The Eleventh Circuit heard an appeal from a district court’s decision denying vacatur of an arbitrator’s decision to certify an arbitration class against a telecommunications provider. The appellant, Southern Communications, was a respondent in an arbitration brought by a consumer who contested certain penalty fees. The arbitration agreement was silent as to class action arbitration. The consumer moved for certification of an arbitration class, and the arbitrator granted the motion, certifying a class. Southern Communications sought vacatur of the decision in federal court, but the court denied vacatur. Southern Communications appealed, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, pointing to the Supreme Court’s recent decision Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013) – which resolved a circuit split as to whether class arbitration was allowable where the arbitration agreement was silent – and the difficult burden for establishing grounds for vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act. Southern Communications Services, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 11-15587 (11th Cir. July 12, 2013)

This post written by John Pitblado.

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A court compelled arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, rather than by state law, in a dispute related to insurance coverage for transported equipment that was damaged by a train derailment. When the insurer denied coverage for the equipment damage, the railway transport companies filed breach of contract and negligence claims against their insurer and the insurer’s agent, respectively. A dispute then arose between the insurer and its agent, in which both parties demanded indemnification from the other pursuant to their underlying agency agreement.

After the insurer demanded arbitration under the agency agreement with respect to the indemnification dispute, the agent objected to the FAA’s application, contending that the arbitration should be governed by New York law. The agent reasoned that the relevant transaction was the procurement of the insurance, which was completed entirely within New York, amongst New York parties. The court rejected the agent’s argument, finding that the FAA did apply because interstate commerce was, in fact, implicated. The relevant transaction was the (interstate) agency agreement between the New York agent and the California insurer, not the (intrastate) procurement of insurance. Even if procurement of the insurance policy was relevant, “insurance is not an entirely intrastate industry” and the FAA would still apply. The court also denied the agent’s request to stay the arbitration until the transport companies’ breach of contract and negligence claims were resolved, holding that the indemnification claims were not intertwined with the coverage dispute, that the potential for inefficiency is not a valid basis for stay under the FAA. Chartis Seguros Mexico, S.A. de C.V. v. HLI Rail & Rigging, LLC, Case No. 1:11-cv-03238 (USDC S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013).

This post written by Michael Wolgin.

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After suffering loss from a drought, a farmer sued his insurance agent for negligent misrepresentation of the amount of crop insurance coverage available and the insurance company that issued his crop insurance policy. The insurance company moved to compel arbitration under the terms of the insurance policy, which is reinsured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and subject to federal regulations requiring disagreements to be resolved by arbitration. The state superior court and court of appeals refused to compel arbitration on the grounds that arbitration would result in piecemeal litigation of the claims against the insurer and the insurance agent. On appeal, the state supreme court reversed, holding that the “Federal Arbitration Act prohibits a state court from ignoring a valid federally mandated arbitration clause on equitable grounds.” Weidert v. Hanson, No. 88293-2 (Wash. Sept. 12, 2013).

This post written by Abigail Kortz.

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As previously reported, Utica Mutual Insurance Company was successful in seeking transfer of its dispute against two reinsurers from the Southern District of New York to the Northern District of New York. The insurance company has again succeeded, defeating a motion to dismiss, and alternatively a motion to stay the proceeding in the Northern District of New York in favor of a suit initiated by one of the reinsurers against Utica in Wisconsin. Rejecting defendants’ contention that the “first-file rule” requires a stay of the New York lawsuit, the court determined that the New York suit can proceed along side the Wisconsin dispute because: a) the New York suit involves an additional defendant not present in the Wisconsin proceeding, b) the New York suit involves an additional claim under the Federal Arbitration Act, and c) Utica asserts it is not amenable to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Employers Insurance Co. of Wausau, Case No. 6:12-CV-1293 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013).

This post written by Abigail Kortz.

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