Reinsurance Focus

Affirming a district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held unenforceable a provision of an employment agreement mandating that wage-and-hour claims could be brought only through individual arbitration and that employees waived “the right to participate in or receive money or any other relief from any class, collective, or representative proceeding.”  The provision further provided that  if the waiver provision was unenforceable, “any claim brought on a class, collective, or representative action basis must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction.”  Employees were not permitted to opt out of this provision; it was a requirement of continued employment.  The Court found the waiver of collective action prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), and rejected the contention that the case involved any conflict between the NLRA and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  This decision appears to conflict with decisions of the Second, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, laying the potential basis for the review of this issue by the Supreme Court.

The Court found that the contractual waiver of the right to proceed in a collective manner was an unlawful restriction of the exercise by the employee of the right to collective action protected by section 7 of the NLRA, a right it termed substantive and”at the heart” of the purpose of the NLRA rather than a procedural right.  Addressing the employer’s contrary interpretation of section 7, the Court found persuasive interpretations of the scope of the protections of section 7 by the National Labor Relations Board, which the Court found to be “a sensible way to understand the statutory language, and thus we must follow it.”

The Court then rejected the employer’s assertion that the case involved a conflict between the NLRA, as it interpreted it, and the FAA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.  The Court reasoned that since the contractual provision at issue is unlawful under section 7 of the NLRA, “it is illegal, and meets the criteria of the FAA’s savings clause for nonenforcement.”  The FAA’s savings clause provides that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  Stating that finding the NLRA in conflict with the FAA “would render the FAA’s savings clause a nullity,” the Court rejected that its decision created a Circuit split, contending that none of the opinions from the other four Circuits “has engaged substantively with the relevant arguments.”  Despite this disclaimer, it appears that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion does conflict with the decisions of other Circuits, and accords the FAA a different role and emphasis than do the opinions of other Circuits. Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., No. 15-2997 (7th Cir. May 26, 2016).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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Rhode Island recently amended its Credit for Reinsurance Act to include two provisions regarding credits for reinsurance relating to the insolvency of the ceding insurer. Specifically, the first provision states that no credit is allowed “unless the reinsurance is payable by the assuming company on the basis of liability of the ceding company under the contractor contracts reinsured without diminution because of the insolvency of the ceding company.” Additionally, the second provision states that no credit is allowed “unless the reinsurance agreement provides that payments by the assuming company shall be made directly to the ceding company or to its liquidator, receiver, or statutory successor” or directly to the insured. Finally, the amendments state that no assuming company “may pay or settle, or agree to pay or settle, any policy claim, or portion of a claim, directly to or with a policyholder of any ceding company if an order of rehabilitation or liquidation has been entered against the ceding company.” These changes appear to be to bring Rhode Island’s statute closer to the model act promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.

R.I. HB 6179 (enacted June 17, 2015) and R.I. SB 939.

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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A disappointed claimant in a FINRA arbitration filed suit under section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in United States District Court to vacate the arbitral award.  The court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The court noted the well established principle that the FAA is not itself a source of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Stating that the parties were not diverse, the court proceeded to evaluate whether it could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction based upon the existence of a federal question.  The plaintiff proposed two bases for federal question jurisdiction: (1) the failure of its opponent to produce certain documents, which it argued constituted a violation of FINRA rules, or a disregard by the panel of FINRA rules; and (2) the fact that the claims pursued in the arbitration included claims under federal securities laws and SEC regulations.  The court rejected both  contentions, finding with respect to the first issue that many courts have held that “manifest disregard” of FINRA or NASD rules do not constitute manifest disregard of federal law for purposes of the FAA.  With respect to the second contention, the court followed a Second Circuit opinion which held that a court may not “look through” the petition to the claims in the underlying arbitration for a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.  The court rejected the argument that jurisdiction was supported by Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), which held that, with respect to petitions to compel arbitration under section 4 of the FAA, courts may look through the petition to determine whether it is predicated on an action that “arises under” federal law. Citing textual differences between sections 4 and 10 of the FAA, the court held that Vaden did not provide support for looking through the petition for purposes of evaluating whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over an action predicted on section 10 of the FAA. Doscher v. Sea Port Group Securities, LLC, Case No. 15-cv-384 (USDC S.D.N.Y. August 5, 2015).

This post written by Rollie Goss.

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A lawsuit filed in the United States Court for the District of Connecticut between Odyssey Reinsurance Company and Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corporation involves a dispute over commission payments in a reinsurance scheme with State National Insurance Company, Inc. According to Odyssey, Cal-Regent has not made the appropriate commission payments for 2003 to 2007. According to Cal-Regent, however, Odyssey failed to perform the contracts and Cal-Regent is entitled to a set-off. In its complaint, Odyssey alleged that it “has performed all of its obligations under the Reinsurance Agreement” and had performed all conditions precedent to bringing suit. Odyssey moved for summary judgment, and Cal-Regent argued that Odyssey was not entitled to summary judgment, among other reasons, because of the dispute over whether the Odyssey had first breached the reinsurance contracts. However, in its answer to Odyssey’s complaint, Cal-Regent had the burden “to deny Odyssey’s performance with particularity, which Cal-Regent failed to do.” Rather than granting summary judgment to Odyssey on this issue, the court issued a decision allowing Cal-Regent to amend its answer and affirmative defenses, including granting leave to add an affirmative defense of material breach.

In another decision issued on the same day, however, the court dismissed Cal-Regent’s counterclaim for a setoff, finding that it had been brought under Connecticut law, rather than Texas law, when the parties had agreed to Texas law in the reinsurance agreement. Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Cal-Regent Insurance Services Corp., No. 3:14-cv-00458-VAB (USDC D. Conn. Aug. 20, 2015).

This post written by Zach Ludens.

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On September 1, 2015, Texas Senate Bill 900 went into effect after passing both the Texas House and Senate this past summer. The bill amends the operation of the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (“TWIA”), a state backed insurer of last resort. The TWIA was created in 1971 to fill in coverage gaps for windstorm and hail protection when private insurance became too expensive or when private insurance simply failed to provide coverage. The goal of the TWIA is to make coverage affordable for residential and commercial properties in areas prone to claims, most notably in certain coastal counties.

Senate Bill 900 makes a few important changes to the association. The insurer’s board of directors will now encompass three members from the insurance industry, three members from coastal Texas counties, and three members from inland Texas. It requires that the insurer maintain “available loss funding” to cover a once in a 100 year storm disaster. It also clarifies the purchasing requirements of reinsurance and alternative risk financing, both used in order to limit payout risk. Finally, Senate Bill 900 allows for the appointment of an administrator to run the insurer.

Texas Senate Bill 900 (2015)

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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In a row between Granite State Insurance Company (“Granite”) and R & Q Reinsurance Company (“R & Q”), a New York trial court denied R & Q’s attempt to (1) vacate a prior court order, (2) appoint a special referee, and (3) dismiss counts in the complaint.

By way of history, the court previously found that certain discovery documents were protected under attorney-client privilege. Looking for reconsideration of this order, the court construed R & Q’s motion to vacate as a motion to renew and/or reargue. The court denied R & Q’s motion to renew as it failed to present a change in law or present new facts that would necessitate an alteration of the prior discovery order. The court also denied R& Q’s motion to reargue finding the “common interest” exception to attorney-client privilege inapplicable between an insurer and reinsurer. Without a relevant exception, the court held that R & Q “failed to demonstrate that [the court] overlooked or misapprehended the relevant facts.”

The court also denied R & Q’s attempt to appoint a special referee because an appointment would only extend an already prolonged discovery process without “special circumstances.” Finally, the court noted that Granite and R & Q engaged in a considerable “meet and confer” process in an effort to narrow the scope of discovery, and thus instead of dismissing claims for which discovery had not yet been provided, the court directed R & Q to re-serve its discovery requests directed to those claims, as appropriately revised based on the parties’ “meet and confer” process.

Granite State Ins. Co. v. R & Q Reinsurance Co., No. 654494/2013 (Sup. Ct. July 22, 2015)

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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The NAIC’s Reinsurance Task Force has been active of late, exposing six different drafts for comment.

Certified Reinsurers

The Reinsurance Financial Analysis (E) Working Group (ReFAWG) developed the Uniform Application Checklist for Certified Reinsurers to help ensure that a reinsurer’s application for certification is complete under the requirements of the Credit for Reinsurance Models. The Checklist also facilitates the “passporting” process, whereby a state has the discretion to defer to another state’s certification and rating of a reinsurer. This latest draft of the Checklist makes changes to the section addressing “Disputed and/or Overdue Reinsurance Claims/Business Practices.” In February 2015, ReFAWG instructed staff to prepare this now-exposed memorandum outlining the group’s responsibilities relating to certified reinsurers and the passporting process.

The comment deadline for these two items is September 15, 2015.

Credit for Reinsurance – XXX/AXXX

Having been charged with creating a new model regulation to establish requirements regarding the reinsurance of XXX/AXXX life insurance policies, the Reinsurance (E) Task Force exposed the draft Non-Universal Life and Universal Life With Secondary Guarantees Credit for Reinsurance Model Regulation. The Task Force also exposed two options for revisions to the Credit for Reinsurance Model Law (#785) to authorize adoption of this new model regulation, Option 1 and Option 2. Key topics that emerged in the drafting of the new model regulation are discussed in an exposed memorandum from its drafting group.

The comment deadline for these four items is September 30, 2015.

This post written by Anthony Cicchetti.

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On August 26, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court had appointment authority under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Overturning a prior order that denied Odyssey Reinsurance Company’s (Odyssey) motion to appoint, the Second Circuit found that the trial court not only had the authority to appoint an arbitration umpire but “the obligation to appoint an umpire to correct a breakdown in the umpire selection process.”

The trial court found that it did not need to intervene in a dispute over worker’s compensation billings. The Second Circuit Court disagreed, finding the parties deadlocked as to the interpretation of various terms in the arbitration agreement concerning umpire qualifications. This “lapse” therefore necessitated the trial court to appoint an arbitration umpire.

Odyssey Reinsurance Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London Syndicate 53, No. 14-2840-cv (2nd Cir. Aug. 26, 2015)

This post written by Matthew Burrows, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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Governor Greg Abbott of Texas has recently signed into law amendments to the Texas Insurance Code broadening the authority of captives.  This law is effective as of September 1, 2015.

There are three amendments in this law:

1. Section 964.052 increases the types of risks that pools can now write to include reinsurance pools composed only of other captives and affiliated captive insurance companies.
2. Section 964.063 provides that captives can, with the permission of the Commissioner, pay dividends or make distributions to “holders of an equity interest in the captive insurance company.”  Further, the Commissioner is required to issue rules implementing this section.
3. Section 964.072 sets forth the two requirements that must be satisfied before a captive can participate in a reinsurance pool pursuant to Section 964.052, the pool is composed only of captive insurance companies; and the captive is sufficiently capitalized in order to meet the pool’s financial obligations.

It is clear that Texas is inviting companies to form their captives in Texas. Tex. SB No. 667 (eff. Sept. 1, 2015).

This post written by Barry Weissman.

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We previously reported on Old Republic National Title Insurance Co. v. First American Title Insurance Co., in which the court partially dismissed First American’s claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing to the extent the predicate breach of reinsurance contract claim alleged by First American failed to state a claim. The court has now denied First American’s motion to amend its answer. In the motion, First American attempted to demonstrate the predicate breach of reinsurance contract by contending that Old Republic failed to make payment under the contract based on false accusations and improper document requests. But the court agreed with Old Republic that the claims as pled did not support First American’s new allegations, and could not serve as a basis for a claim for the breach of the utmost duty of good faith. Old Republic Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. First American Title Ins. Co., No. 8:15-cv-126-T-30EAJ (USDC M.D. Fla. July 17, 2015).

This post written by Whitney Fore, a law clerk at Carlton Fields Jorden Burt in Washington, DC.

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